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A SCANDALOUS PERVERSION OF TRUST: 
MODERN LESSONS FROM THE EARLY HISTORY OF  
CONGRESSIONAL INSIDER TRADING 
 
Michael A. Perino* 
Abstract 
The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (the 
“STOCK Act”) affirms that members of Congress are not exempt from 
insider trading prohibitions. Legal scholars, however, continue to de-
bate whether the legislation was necessary. Leveraging recent scholar-
ship on fiduciary political theory, some commentators contend that be-
cause members owe fiduciary-like duties to citizens, to their fellow 
members, and to Congress as an institution, existing insider trading 
theories already prohibited them from using material nonpublic infor-
mation for personal gain. These arguments, while plausible, are incom-
plete. They rely on broad conceptions of legislators as fiduciaries, but 
provide scant evidence that members violate institutional norms when 
capitalizing on confidential information, a crucial step for fitting their 
trading into existing legal doctrines.   
This Article fills that gap. Like other scholarship on governmental 
fiduciaries, it examines the foundational norms in Congress, focusing 
specifically on an episode not previously discussed in the literature. In 
1778, Samuel Chase, a member of the Second Continental Congress, 
used his knowledge of plans to purchase supplies for the Continental 
Army to reap a substantial profit by cornering the market for flour in 
 
     *      Dean George W. Matheson Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. 
Subject to the usual caveats, the author would like to thank Sung Hui Kim and Mark 
Movsesian for helpful comments and suggestions. John Harras and Mona Patel provided 
excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are my own. 
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his home state.  This Article documents the reaction to the Chase scan-
dal and demonstrates that from the earliest days of the institution con-
gressmen expected that members would not attempt to use confidential 
information for financial gain. Alexander Hamilton and other critics 
universally concluded that Chase had committed a “scandalous perver-
sion of [his] trust.” This episode and other evidence compiled here 
strongly suggest that the STOCK Act was unnecessary to hold members 
of Congress liable for insider trading. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2011, a 60 Minutes report set off a firestorm of con-
troversy when it accused several members of Congress of reaping enor-
mous profits from insider trading.1 The report was based, in part, on a 
tendentious book by Peter Schweizer, a research fellow at the Hoover 
Institution. Schweizer offered a series of anecdotes about members 
who allegedly exploited material nonpublic information for their own 
financial gain.2 In each case, he contended, these actions could have 
 
 1. 60 Minutes: Congress Trading on Inside Information? (CBS News Television 
Broadcast Nov. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7388130n. Earlier press reports contained 
similar allegations, but did not result in the same level of public outrage. See Brody 
Mullins, et al., Congress Staffers Gain from Trading in Stocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 
2010, at A1; Jane J. Kim, U.S. Senators’ Stock Picks Outperform the Pros’, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 26, 2004, at D2. 
 2. See generally PETER SCHWEIZER, THROW THEM ALL OUT: HOW POLITICIANS AND 
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been criminal violations of the federal securities laws but for the fact 
that they were committed by members of Congress.3 These sensational 
anecdotal accounts were not the only evidence of congressional insider 
trading. One empirical study suggested that senators reaped statisti-
cally significant positive abnormal returns from their stock trading.4 
In just a few months, bills to close the loophole that theoretically al-
lowed legislators to escape liability for insider trading sailed through 
the House and Senate virtually unopposed. On April 4, 2012, President 
Obama signed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (the 
“STOCK Act”), which affirmed that members of Congress were not ex-
empt from the federal securities laws’ insider trading prohibitions.5   
As a matter of political expediency, Congress had little choice but 
to pass the STOCK Act. As a legal matter, however, was it necessary? 
Were members of Congress really exempt from insider trading pro-
scriptions? Legal scholars split on that question. The debate arose be-
cause of the uncertain contours for insider trading liability. There is 
no explicit ban on insider trading under federal law;6 instead, civil and 
criminal insider trading actions are generally brought under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 and Rule 10b-5,8 which 
together operate as a catch-all antifraud rule. Federal courts first de-
fined insider trading as fraudulent under Rule 10b-5 in the late 1960s,9 
but in a series of opinions the United States Supreme Court held that 
not all instances of trading on material nonpublic information consti-
tuted fraud.10 In order to impose civil or criminal liability, the govern-
ment had to prove that the trader owed a fiduciary or other duty of 
 
THEIR FRIENDS GET RICH OFF INSIDER STOCK TIPS, LAND DEALS, AND CRONYISM THAT 
WOULD SEND THE REST OF US TO PRISON (2012).  
 3. Id. 
 4. Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments 
of the U.S. Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 661, 675-76 (2004) [hereinafter 
Ziobrowski, Senate Study]. 
 5. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 
291 (2012). 
 6. Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–376, 
98 Stat. 1264 (1984), and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100–704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988), but those statutes focused on defining 
civil remedies for contemporaneous traders in the marketplace or enhancing the penal-
ties that could be imposed in governmental enforcement actions rather than defining 
the elements of an insider trading action. 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
 9. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(en banc), cert denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In 1961, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission recognized for the first time that insider trading violated Rule 10b-5. In re Cady, 
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910-11 (1961). 
 10. See, e.g., Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983); Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-35 (1980). 
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trust and confidence either to the person on the other side of the trans-
action or to the source of the information.11 
Some securities law scholars, most prominently Donna Nagy, 
wrote before passage of the STOCK Act that legislation was unneces-
sary because members of Congress already “owe[d] fiduciary-like du-
ties of trust and confidence to a host of persons including the citizen-
investors whom they serve, as well as the federal government, other 
members of Congress, and government officials outside of Congress 
who rely on their loyalty and integrity.”12 While other scholars thought 
such arguments were “plausible,”13 many were far more skeptical. Ste-
phen Bainbridge led the opposition, arguing that generalized notions 
that legislators were supposed to act in the public interest were an 
insufficient basis for imposing potential criminal liability.14  
Despite passage of the STOCK Act, debate continues over whether 
it was necessary and whether members of Congress prior to passage 
of that law violated a duty when they traded on material nonpublic 
information.15 While proponents of this view have generally made com-
pelling arguments, those arguments have been frustratingly incom-
plete. They most frequently rely on broad conceptions of legislators as 
fiduciaries or analogies that compare congressmen to various actors in 
 
 11. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653; 
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-35. In 2000, the SEC promulgated a rule that, in effect, codi-
fied those bases for liability. Rule 10b5-1(a) provides that: 
The “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) of the 
Act (15 U.S.C. 78j) and § 240.10b-5 thereunder include, among other things, 
the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material non-
public information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or 
confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively to the issuer of that 
security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the 
source of the material nonpublic information. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a). 
 12. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrust-
ment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2011); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading 
and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 34-35 
(1982) (suggesting that government officials owe “some duty of fair dealing” to United 
States citizens, although not directly addressing members of Congress). 
 13. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Regulation and Scholarship: Constant 
Companions or Occasional Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 107 (2009). 
 14. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281, 
295-97 (2011). The key provision of the STOCK Act purports to clarify this uncertainty. 
It provides that “each Member of Congress . . . owes a duty arising from a relationship 
of trust and confidence to the Congress, the United States Government, and the citizens 
of the United States with respect to material nonpublic information derived from such 
person’s position as a Member of Congress . . . or gained from the performance of such 
person’s official responsibilities.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g)(1) (2012). 
 15. See generally Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider 
Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845 (2013). 
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business organizations who clearly possess fiduciary duties.16 Unfor-
tunately, they provide scant evidence that members violate institu-
tional norms when capitalizing on confidential information, a crucial 
step for fitting congressional insider trading into existing legal doc-
trines. As such, these arguments cannot directly refute the claim that 
those broad duties do not and have never been conceived to prohibit 
the use of material nonpublic information learned through legislative 
activities for personal gain. 
This Article seeks to fill the gap in the literature on congressional 
insider trading by examining the foundational norms in Congress re-
garding the use of confidential information. It is an example of what 
Alfred Brophy recently dubbed “applied legal history,” an attempt to 
use historical analysis to answer legal questions of contemporary sig-
nificance.17 The Article focuses on the Second Continental Congress 
and the story of Samuel Chase. Chase is best known as the first and 
only Supreme Court Justice ever impeached in the House of Repre-
sentatives, although the Senate voted to acquit him of the charges in 
1805.18 Chase’s relevance for understanding attitudes about the mis-
use of nonpublic information involves not that famous episode, but one 
that occurred more than twenty-five years earlier when Chase served 
on Maryland’s delegation to the Continental Congress.19 In the sum-
mer of 1778, Chase learned that Congress would authorize the pur-
chase of large amounts of flour in Maryland and other mid-Atlantic 
states so that it could be shipped to the Continental Army and the 
newly arrived French fleet then preparing to fight in Rhode Island.20 
Chase instructed his business partners to buy up flour in Baltimore, 
effectively cornering the local market.21 The men reaped a substantial 
profit when they re-sold the provisions to the government later that 
fall.22 
Chase’s scheme did not involve a securities transaction and there-
fore it is technically not insider trading within the meaning of Rule 
 
 16. See id. at 870-77. 
 17. See Alfred L. Brophy, Introducing Applied Legal History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 
233, 233 (2013) (defining “applied legal history” as “deeply researched, serious scholar-
ship that is motivated by, engages with, or speaks to contemporary issues”).  
 18. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF 
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 15-27, 104-05 (1999). 
 19. 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1789-1800, 105 (Maeva Marcus, et al. eds., 1985) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT]. 
 20. See id. at 107; see also JANE SHAFFER ELSMERE, JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE 19-20 
(1980). 
 21. See ELSMERE, supra note 20, at 20-21. 
 22. See id. 
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10b-5,23 but the reaction to it still tells us a great deal about the earli-
est institutional norms in Congress concerning the use of nonpublic 
information for personal profit. Alexander Hamilton, then serving as 
an aide-de-camp to George Washington,24 was among the most vocif-
erous critics.25 He accused Chase of committing “a scandalous perver-
sion of your trust.”26 Within a month, Maryland revoked Chase’s ap-
pointment and warned future delegates that they had a duty “to be 
watchful each one over the conduct of the other” so as to prevent any 
repetition of this kind of dishonorable practice.27 Other reactions were 
similar, and although Chase would eventually return to Congress and 
secure appointment to the Supreme Court, the scandal dogged him for 
the rest of his life.28 In the tumultuous politics of the times, Chase was 
hardly alone in being the target of scathing invective, both from polit-
ical opponents and opposition newspapers. Blistering rhetoric was the 
norm rather than the exception in the late eighteenth century. What 
was notable, however, was the nearly universal conclusion (even from 
members of his own party) that Chase had behaved dishonorably as a 
result of “his breach of confidence as a member of Congress.”29  
The Chase episode illustrates that, from the earliest days of the 
institution, congressmen expected that their fellow members would 
not attempt to profit from the confidential information to which they 
were privy. The flour scandal demonstrates that a member of Congress 
using confidential information for personal gain breached a duty of 
trust and confidence owed to the government in general and to fellow 
members of Congress in particular. Such trading would thus fit neatly 
within the pre-existing contours of Rule 10b-5. Passing the STOCK Act 
was, in other words, unnecessary to hold a member of Congress liable 
for insider trading. 
To be sure, the hostile reactions to and universal condemnation of 
 
 23. Traditionally, insider trading proscriptions did not apply to commodities trans-
actions. As a result of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, however, it is now unlawful to trade commodities on the basis of material nonpublic 
information in breach of a pre-existing duty or obtained through fraud or deceit. 7 U.S.C. 
§ 6(c) (2012); 17 C.F.R. §180.1 (2013). 
 24. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 85-125 (2004). 
 25. See Alexander Hamilton, Publius Letter, II (Oct. 26, 1778), in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 1768-1778, 567-70 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 
1961), all volumes available at http://founders.archives.gov/content/volumes#Hamilton  
[hereinafter 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON]. 
 26. Id. at 570. 
 27. See Letter from Henry Laurens to William Smith (Sept. 12, 1778), in 10 LETTERS 
OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, 626 n.1 (Paul H. Smith et al. eds., 1983) [here-
inafter LDC].  
 28. See ELSMERE, supra note 20, at 22.  
 29. JAMES HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT: THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE 215 (1980) (in-
ternal citation omitted).  
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Chase’s scheme were, at least in part, premised on a somewhat differ-
ent set of cultural assumptions and expectations then we would have 
today. Chase’s actions were viewed as wrongful because they ran coun-
ter to the ethos of republican civic virtue that prevailed in the nascent 
United States.30 Although civic virtue as a basis for organizing the re-
public quickly faded from the scene, the reasons offered in the 1770s 
to explain why Chase’s actions were wrongful remain relevant today. 
Chase’s plan imposed a direct economic harm on the government be-
cause it was forced to pay higher prices for the commodities it needed 
for the war effort. More importantly, Chase’s actions brought Congress 
and the United States government into disrepute. His actions made it 
harder for the average American to believe that the government was 
made up of disinterested individuals looking to promote the common 
good rather than to secure their own economic fortunes. Both those 
harms—the direct economic impact and the reputational harm the 
source of the information suffers—are at the heart of the modern nor-
mative critique of insider trading by governmental actors.   
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Section II pro-
vides a more detailed analysis of the debate over whether members of 
Congress could be held liable for insider trading prior to passage of the 
STOCK Act. Section III discusses Samuel Chase and the flour trading 
scandal. Section IV describes the general reaction to Chase’s conduct, 
which demonstrates the strong institutional norm against members of 
Congress profiting from confidential information. To place that reac-
tion in historical and cultural context, the section closely examines 
Hamilton’s denunciation of Chase’s behavior—a series of three open 
letters appearing under the name “Publius.”31 While a complete his-
tory of congressional insider trading is beyond the scope of this Article, 
Section V briefly analyzes evidence consistent with the idea that these 
institutional norms against the use of nonpublic information for pri-
vate gain survived the demise of civic republicanism on which they 
were premised and continued into modern Congresses. Section VI con-
cludes. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL INSIDER TRADING BEFORE THE STOCK ACT 
Legal academics are united in their normative conclusion about 
the propriety of congressional insider trading. Virtually no one sug-
gests that, as a policy matter, legislators should be allowed to trade on 
 
 30. See infra Section IV. 
 31. Alexander Hamilton, Publius Letter, I (Oct. 16, 1778), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEX-
ANDER HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 562-63; Alexander Hamilton, Publius Letter, II (Oct. 
26, 1778), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 25 at 567-70; Alexan-
der Hamilton, Publius Letter, III (Nov. 16, 1778), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAM-
ILTON, supra note 25, at 580-82.  
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material nonpublic information.32 Insider trading by such individuals 
is improper, among other reasons, because it “undermines the public’s 
trust and confidence in the government,” and because it may lead to 
decisions (or a common belief that decisions) are made to maximize 
profits rather than to serve the public interest.33 Stock market tips 
could easily function as the payoffs for desired legislative actions.34 
Even Henry Manne, the most adamant opponent of insider trading re-
strictions, argued that there is no legitimate policy rationale for per-
mitting members of Congress to trade on the basis of material nonpub-
lic information they acquire in performing their official functions.35  
Nonetheless, those same legal scholars have split regarding 
whether insider trading law as it existed prior to passage of the 
STOCK Act actually covered members of Congress. There is no need 
to reiterate those arguments at length here. The key question they 
raise is whether a member of Congress owes a fiduciary or other duty 
of trust and confidence either to the person on the other side of the 
transaction or to the source of the information. This section highlights 
the gaps in the current argument with respect to whether members of 
Congress owed such a duty. 
Under what is known as the “classic” theory, insiders in posses-
sion of material nonpublic information must either disclose that infor-
mation to the investing public before trading or abstain from trading 
entirely if they owe a fiduciary or other duty of trust and confidence to 
the person on the other side of the transaction.36 For example, a direc-
tor, executive, or employee of a corporation trading on the basis of ma-
terial nonpublic information with the shareholders of her company 
would violate Rule 10b-5 because she owes a fiduciary duty to them.37 
Holding members of Congress liable under the classic theory would 
thus require finding that they owe a fiduciary or other duty of trust 
and confidence to those contemporaneously trading in the securities 
markets.  
Some securities law scholars take this position. Donna Nagy, for 
example, has argued that members of Congress occupy a position of 
 
 32. For the one brief exception, see M. Todd Henderson & Larry Ribstein, Let Mem-
bers of Congress Trade!, POLITICO (Dec. 1, 2011, 11:19 PM), http://www.polit-
ico.com/news/stories/1211/69601.html.  
 33. Nagy, supra note 12, at 1133; HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE 
STOCK MARKET (1966), reprinted in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HENRY G. MANNE 194 
(Fred S. McChesney, 2009). 
 34. See MANNE, supra note 33, at 194. 
 35. Id. at 188-94. 
 36. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1980).   
 37. See Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) (holding that corpo-
rate officers are “forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undis-
closed corporate information to their advantage.”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Talbot, 530 
F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (corporate directors). 
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“public trust,” and that their behavior should be governed by the fidu-
ciary standards that govern their relationship with “citizen-inves-
tors.”38 Sung Hui Kim takes a similar position, arguing that at its core 
fiduciary duty articulates an anti-corruption norm that should prevent 
public officials from exploiting their offices for private gain.39  
Nagy and Kim premise their arguments, in part, on an emerging 
body of scholarship that conceives of government officials as fiduciar-
ies for citizens.40 The applicability of that scholarship to insider trad-
ing is, however, far from clear. Relying on a variety of eighteenth cen-
tury sources, proponents of “fiduciary political theory” argue that gov-
ernment officials, including members of Congress, were often thought 
to have fiduciary duties of loyalty akin to those of agents.41 Indeed, it 
was commonplace during that time to use the language of trusts to 
describe the duties of legislators.42 To take just one example, in 1765 
John Adams wrote that a country’s rulers were “no more than attor-
neys, agents and trustees for the people; and if the cause, the interest 
and trust is insidiously betray’d, or wantonly trifled away, the people 
have a right to revoke the authority, that they themselves have de-
puted, and to constitute abler and better agents, attorneys and trus-
tees.”43 There is little doubt that this language is consistent with the 
 
 38. Nagy, supra note 12, at 1140-47. 
 39. Kim, supra note 15, at 903-08; see also Sung Hui Kim, What Governmental In-
sider Trading Teaches Us about Corporate Insider Trading, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INSIDER TRADING 166, 173-76 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013). 
 40. In a series of articles in the last decade, Robert G. Natelson developed the idea 
that the drafters of the Constitution conceived of government actors as standing in a 
fiduciary relationship to the governed. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution 
and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, Public Trust]; 
Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, Agency Law Origins]. Natelson 
was not the first scholar to make this claim. See Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough 
Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57 
(1996). In the wake of Natelson’s work, however, a flurry of articles have argued that 
various governmental actors should be subject to fiduciary constraints. See Ethan J. 
Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. 
REV. 699 (2013) [hereinafter Leib, Ponet & Serota, A Fiduciary Theory]; David L. Ponet 
& Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1249 (2011) [hereinafter Ponet & Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons]; Evan J. Criddle, Fi-
duciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010). Other scholars are using corporate law principles developed to 
deal with conflicts of interest as a framework for addressing conflicts of interest involv-
ing government officials. See generally D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013) (recommending evaluating political gerrymandering claims 
using the standards of review developed to address corporate conflicts of interest). 
 41. Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 40, at 1146-50; see also Rave, supra note 40, 
at 709 (arguing that the idea of government acting as trustee for the governed “played 
a prominent role in . . . constitutional debate[s] surrounding the American Revolution”).  
 42. Rave, supra note 40, at 710. 
 43. John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law (1765), reprinted 
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kinds of breaches of trust that would be amenable to insider trading 
prosecution.44 Legislators, after all, have the same ability to profit 
from informational asymmetries as other agents on whom we typically 
impose an abstain-or-disclose duty.45 
But the historical sources, recent cases articulating similar views, 
and the existing scholarship tend to speak in broad general terms.46  
Identifying someone as a fiduciary is only the first step in the analy-
sis.47 The more difficult challenge is giving content to any particular 
fiduciary relationship.48 As the Supreme Court noted in SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., such a determination merely “gives direction to further 
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a 
fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge those obliga-
tions?”49 The Court’s point is crucial in understanding why simply 
placing the label “fiduciary” on a member of Congress is inadequate to 
resolve the insider trading question. Courts and scholars use the term 
“fiduciary” in a wide array of settings, but the obligations and prohibi-
tions imposed in such a relationship are context specific. Trustees, di-
rectors, doctors, and lawyers are all fiduciaries, but the restrictions 
imposed on their activities vary widely.50 
It is with respect to the precise contours of a member’s relation-
ship to the trading public that current scholarship is silent. If we re-
turn to the eighteenth century sources on which Natelson and other 
scholars rely, we find some evidence that agents were prohibited from 
exploiting informational advantages to earn a profit in transactions 
with the principal. Professor Natelson quotes from the eighteenth cen-
tury Scottish jurist Lord Kames, whose treatise, Principles of Equity, 
was well-known among lawyers practicing in the United States in the 
late eighteenth century.51 Kames wrote that equity “prohibits a trus-
 
in 1 THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 128, 134 (David A. Hollinger & Charles 
Capper eds., 6th ed. 2011) [hereinafter Adams, Dissertation on the Canon]. Conceiving 
of public officials as trustees can be traced from Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero through 
John Locke and Edmund Burke. See Leib, Ponet & Serota, A Fiduciary Theory, supra 
note 40, at 708; Criddle, supra note 40, at 466-67.  
 44. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Ponet & Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons, supra note 40, at 1255-56. 
 46. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 15, at 877-80 (collecting cases in which courts refer to 
various elected and unelected government officials as fiduciaries of the people and to 
public office as a “public trust”).  
 47. See Clark, supra note 40, at 69-70. 
 48. See id. 
 49. 318 U.S. 80, 86 (1943). 
 50. See Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Prin-
ciples into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 91, 92 (2013) [hereinafter Leib, Ponet & Ser-
ota, Translating Fiduciary]; Clark, supra note 40, at 69-71.  
 51. Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 40, at 1128. 
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tee from making any profit by his management, directly or indi-
rectly.”52 Courts expressed particular concern regarding transactions 
between the agent and the principal because of fear that the agent 
might use his superior information about matters within the scope of 
the agency relationship to the principal’s disadvantage.53 To eliminate 
this problem, equity courts outlawed almost all transactions between 
an agent and a principal.54  
While these cases could be interpreted to cover insider trading, we 
cannot know with certainty from these sources how such behavior 
would have been treated or whether those same principles would have 
been applied outside the context of private agency relationships. There 
appears to be no evidence that the law extended those prohibitions to 
legislators or other government officials, and Professor Natelson pro-
vides no details specifying what the broad trustee language that was 
typically employed meant in terms of confidential information in the 
hands of legislators.55 In short, none of these sources address the spe-
cific question at hand—whether a legislator’s duty to citizens at large 
included a duty to refrain from exploiting confidential information.56  
As a result, those arguing that the classic theory of insider trading 
encompassed legislators were required to make a logical leap, arguing 
either by way of analogy or as a normative matter that the same re-
strictions courts applied to agents in the private context should apply 
equally to legislative agents.57 There is, however, a significant problem 
in relying on these kinds of facile comparisons when analyzing some-
thing as amorphous as the scope of a fiduciary duty. Tamar Frankel, 
one of the leading authorities on fiduciary law, has noted the limited 
 
 52. Id. at 1128 (citing LORD KAMES (HENRY HOME), PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 225 (2d 
ed., 1767)). Other sources available in the United States in the late eighteenth century 
were even less helpful. Blackstone’s Commentaries is devoid of any discussion regarding 
an agent’s use of confidential information. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-1769). 
 53. Fox v. Mackreth, (1788) 29 Eng. Rep. 224 (Ct. Ch.); Keech v. Sandford, (1726) 25 
Eng. Rep. 223, 223-24 (holding that a trustee who acquires knowledge that his princi-
pal’s lease is about to expire cannot renew that lease under his own name).  
 54. See FREDERICK THOMAS WHITE & OWEN DAVIES TUDOR, A SELECTION OF LEAD-
ING CASES IN EQUITY 175, 188-89 (1888). 
 55. See, e.g., Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 40, at 1114, 1122, 1159-61. 
 56. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES: HOW 
ETHICS REFORM CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE 163 (2009) (“Fiduciary principles that bind 
public officials, however, have not evolved along the same legal trajectory as fiduciary 
principles in private law.”); Kim, supra note 15, at 880 (acknowledging that even if pub-
lic officials are fiduciaries that does not necessarily mean that they have a duty of dis-
closure under federal insider trading law). 
 57. See Kim, supra note 15, at 875-77; Nagy, supra note 12, at 1111. Private agents 
clearly have such a duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1957). The Supreme 
Court relied on this provision in fashioning its insider trading rules. See United States 
v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654-55 (1997).   
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utility of analogies in fiduciary contexts.58 Analogies can be particu-
larly unhelpful, she notes, in addressing new situations, like congres-
sional insider trading,59 “because the rules that apply to the old proto-
types do not necessarily respond to the problems posed by the new 
ones.”60  
Other securities law scholars were quick to point out this flaw in 
the existing arguments. A broad general duty to make decisions in the 
public interest, Stephen Bainbridge asserted, is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether legislators have a duty to refrain from trading on ma-
terial nonpublic information.61 John C. Coffee, Jr. testified in the hear-
ings leading up to passage of the STOCK Act that “[m]embers of Con-
gress do not clearly owe a fiduciary duty (or any similar duty requiring 
them to be loyal and hold information in confidence) . . . to their trad-
ing partners in a securities (or commodities) transaction.”62 To help 
resolve the existing uncertainty, it would be useful to have something 
more concrete than a generalized notion that members of Congress are 
fiduciaries for the people. Actual examples of legislators who were 
found to have violated their duties to the public by using confidential 
information to their personal financial advantage would strengthen 
the case substantially. To date, however, those examples have been 
missing from the debate. 
The second and most promising theory for bringing an insider 
trading case against a member of Congress is the “misappropriation” 
theory, which premises liability on a breach of fiduciary duty owed to 
 
 58. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 804-08 (1983).  
 59. See id. at 805. 
 60. Id. Frankel also faults courts for both their inconsistent application of analogies 
and their failure to explain fully why some similarities between relationships are dis-
positive while others are not. Id.  
 61. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 295; Matthew Barbabella et al., Insider Trad-
ing in Congress: The Need for Regulation, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 199, 216-17 (2009) (recog-
nizing that a “vague sense that congressional representatives ought to p lace public in-
terests first” might be insufficient to create the kind of duty necessary to impose insider 
trading liability). As several prominent scholars writing on fiduciary political theory 
warned in another context, “political relationships and corporate relationships are suf-
ficiently different that one should be wary of seamless application from one context to 
the other.” Leib, Ponet & Serota, Translating Fiduciary, supra note 50, at 94. 
 62. Insider Trading and Congressional Accountability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 112th Cong. 143 (2011) (statement of John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Professor, Colum. Univ. Law Sch.); see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, 
SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 2013 SUPPLEMENT 43 (12th ed., 2013) 
(“Until 2012, it was an open question whether members of Congress, or their employees, 
could violate the insider trading prohibition by trading on the basis of material nonpub-
lic information that they acquired in the performance of their official duties.”); PAINTER, 
supra note 56, at 175 (noting that “Congress has apparently managed to create sufficient 
ambiguity around fiduciary obligations of members . . . that the rules may not apply to 
them.”). 
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the source of the information.63 The primary difficulty here is that case 
law analyzing which relationships are sufficient to impose such a duty 
is inconsistent. Traditional fiduciary relationships (such as those be-
tween a lawyer and a client,64 a psychiatrist and a patient,65 or an em-
ployer and an employee66) clearly suffice, but as previously discussed, 
it remains uncertain whether legislators possess such a duty and, if 
so, whether it encompasses a duty not to exploit confidential infor-
mation for their personal financial benefit.67 Relationships of trust and 
confidence are more nebulous. Some courts took a narrow approach, 
holding that the relationship had to be the “functional equivalent of a 
fiduciary relationship”68 in order to qualify.69 Other courts were seem-
ingly more expansive, finding liability in the context of a diverse num-
ber of relationships, even seemingly arm’s length business arrange-
ments.70 
To help resolve this split, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2, a 
non-exclusive list of three “circumstances in which a person has a duty 
of trust or confidence for purposes of the ‘misappropriation’ theory of 
insider trading.”71 Two of those circumstances are relevant to congres-
sional insider trading.72 The first involves situations in which “a per-
son agrees to maintain information in confidence.”73 The most obvious 
source for the necessary contractual provision would be government 
ethics rules.74 Critics like Stephen Bainbridge, however, argue that 
these rules provide an insufficient basis for insider trading liability 
because members “are bound only by the implied obligations created 
 
 63. O’Hagan v. United States, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997). 
 64. See id. at 658 n.8. 
 65. See United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 66. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 67. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 68. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.3d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 69. See id. at 568-71 (holding that a husband and wife did not have a relationship of 
trust and confidence because the government did not show that they repeatedly shared 
business confidences); see also Walton v. Morgan Stanley, 623 F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir. 
1980) (finding that a fiduciary relationship is not created simply by entrusting a third 
party with confidential information). 
 70. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. McGee, 895 F. Supp. 2d 669, 678 (E.D. Pa. 
2012) (members of Alcoholics Anonymous); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 
2d 508, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (electrician working as independent contractor). 
 71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2014). 
 72. See id. §§ 240.10b5-2(b)(1)–240.10b5-2(b)(2). The third circumstance is “[w]hen-
ever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, 
parent, child, or sibling . . . .” Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(3). 
 73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1). 
 74. Kim, supra note 15, at 882 (citing the Code of Ethics for Government Service, 
which provides that “[a]ny person in Government Service should . . . [n]ever use any 
information coming to him confidentially in the performance of governmental duties as 
a means for making private profit.”). 
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by congressional ethics rules.”75 To be sure, governmental employees 
(as agents) are subject to fiduciary duties and could be liable under the 
misappropriation theory. But members of Congress are not employees 
in the traditional sense. Quoting a former SEC enforcement official, 
Bainbridge asserted that “[i]f a congressman learns that his committee 
is about to do something that would affect a company, he can go trade 
on that because he is not obligated to keep that information confiden-
tial . . . . He is not breaching a duty of confidentiality to anybody.”76 
Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) provides that a duty of trust and confidence also 
exists  
[w]henever the person communicating the material nonpublic 
 information and the person to whom it is communicated have  a 
history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the re-
cipient of the information knows or reasonably should know that 
the person communicating the material nonpublic information ex-
pects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality.77  
Based on that rule, Donna Nagy argued that the STOCK Act was 
unnecessary because members of Congress “owe fiduciary-like duties 
of trust and confidence to . . .  the federal government, other members 
of Congress, and government officials outside of Congress who rely on 
their loyalty and integrity.”78 Like other fiduciaries, they are required 
to maintain the confidentiality of information that is entrusted to them 
and may not use that information for their own personal benefit. Re-
lying largely on public corruption cases, Professor Nagy makes a case 
that congressional insider trading could fit easily in the misappropri-
ation doctrine.79 Other academics were unsure. They accepted the 
proposition that members of Congress have such a duty of trust and 
confidence but recognized that a narrower view of the current law 
might be more likely to prevail.80  
Indeed, Professor Nagy recognized the limits of her own analysis. 
She noted, for example, “that there has yet to be a federal prosecution 
for the undisclosed, self-serving use of congressional knowledge for 
 
 75. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 293. 
 76. Id. at 295-96 (quoting Peter Lattman, Bill Looks to Ban Insider Trading for Law-
makers and Their Aids, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006 at A1).  
 77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2). 
 78. Nagy, supra note 12, at 1111. 
 79. Id. at 1116-27. 
 80. See Macey & O’Hara, supra note 13, at 107; see also Insider Trading and Con-
gressional Accountability, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Govern-
mental Affairs, 112th Cong. 12-13 (2011) (testimony of Donald C. Langevoort) (“[I]t is 
possible that courts would rule that current insider trading law adequately proscribes 
all abusive trading in securities on Capitol Hill. But there is sufficient doubt, especially 
in light of how courts recently have been reading Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, [so 
that explicit legislative clarification is desirable].”). 
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personal profit.”81 The public corruption cases she cites that involve 
the misuse of some form of inside information involve employees in the 
executive branch,82 personnel at administrative agencies,83 a Chicago 
alderman,84 and a state executive branch official,85 not congressmen. 
And while it is easy to think of trading on confidential information for 
private gain as an obvious form of political corruption, defining an ac-
tivity as “corrupt” does not necessarily mean the activity is illegal.86 
Finally, Professor Nagy highlighted that while the SEC could attempt 
to show a “history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences,”87 a 
member of Congress might argue that his or her fellow legislators im-
plicitly condoned the use of nonpublic information. “One certainly 
would hope,” she wrote, “that this contention would not prove true em-
pirically, and that [the trading activity] would instead draw scorn from 
other members of Congress who would regard such trading as unethi-
cal and outrageous.”88  
The question of whether legislators are guilty of a breach of duty 
when they misappropriate confidential information for their own per-
sonal benefit thus turns to a large degree on institutional norms. The 
next section examines that issue by looking at Congress’s earliest his-
tory. Naturally, norms and expectations may have changed over time, 
but as with other scholarship on governmental actors as fiduciaries, it 
 
 81. Nagy, supra note 12, at 1149; see also Insider Trading and Congressional Ac-
countability, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 
112th Cong. 169 (2011) (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, SEC Division of En-
forcement) (noting that “[t]he question of duty is more novel for Members of Congress 
[because] [t]here does not appear to be any case law that addresses the duty of a Member 
with respect to trading on the basis of information the Member learns in an official ca-
pacity.”). 
     Two precedents are at least partially relevant. In 1976, the House reprimanded Rep-
resentative Robert Sikes “for purchasing stock in a private bank that he was trying to 
establish” at a naval air station. Andrew George, Public (Self)-Service: Illegal Trading 
on Confidential Congressional Information, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y Rev. 161, 167 (2008) 
(internal citation omitted). That internal disciplinary action, however, was obviously not 
a judicial proceeding to enforce the federal securities laws. Professor Kim also relies on 
United States v. Podell, 436 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In that case, the court held 
that a congressman stood “in a fiduciary relationship with the United States” and thus 
was required to disgorge a bribe paid to him. Id. at 1042. While the case is useful for 
recognizing that members are fiduciaries, it does not address the question of whether 
their fiduciary duty prohibits them from using confidential information for private gain. 
See Kim, supra note 15, at 891 (noting that “the scope of the duty not to use entrusted 
information for personal gain may vary from one fiduciary context to another.”). 
 82. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 472 (1910); Peckham v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 483, 484 
(1910); Price v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 488, 488-89 (1910). 
 83. United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 84. United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 534 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 85. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 86. See Kim, supra note 15, at 898 n.305. 
 87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2). 
 88. Nagy, supra note 12, at 1158. 
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is useful to begin with the foundational norms of the institution. In 
Congress’s earliest days, were members expected to keep information 
confidential? Were those who violated that expectation subject to 
scorn? Was exploiting confidential information for personal gain re-
garded as unethical and outrageous conduct? The answer to all of 
those questions is “yes.”  
III. SAMUEL CHASE AND THE FLOUR SCANDAL 
Samuel Chase was a rough and bumptious lawyer who yearned to 
live the life of a gentleman. The son of an Anglican priest (who was 
accused of misappropriating assets and who at one point ended up in 
debtors’ prison), Chase, like his father, habitually lived beyond his 
means. According to his biographers, Chase inherited his father’s “ag-
gressiveness and impulsiveness” as well as his “extravagance and 
carelessness in financial matters.”89 As a young man, Chase received 
a gentlemen’s education, but his modest circumstances left him feeling 
inferior to Maryland’s wealthy social elite. Still, he was in the van-
guard of a new kind of politician—a rabble-rouser, a patriot, and to 
some a demagogue, who could hurl political insults with anyone.90 
Chase appealed to and could mobilize what were commonly known as 
the “middling sort,” small farmers, property owning tradesmen, shop-
keepers, and artisans who became his power base.91 The ruddy-faced 
lawyer (nicknamed “Old Bacon Face”)92 was economically one of them, 
but he desperately sought the kind of wealth that could make him a 
respectable gentleman. From a young age, Chase kept an eye out for 
opportunities that would earn him a quick return. While still a neo-
phyte and none too prosperous attorney, he started speculating in 
land.  As often as not his schemes and his desire to acquire all the 
trappings of the landed gentry left him in a precarious financial posi-
tion.93 
 
 89. HAW, supra note 29, at 7. Other biographical information on Chase (most of 
which focuses on his judicial career and the impeachment proceedings against him) can 
be found in ELSMERE, supra note 20, at 1-35; REHNQUIST, supra note 18, at 15-27, 42-
113; Robert R. Bair & Robin D. Coblentz, The Trials of Mr. Justice Samuel Chase, 27 
MD. L. REV. 365 (1967); Charles B. Blackmar, On the Removal of Judges: The Impeach-
ment Trial of Samuel Chase, 48. J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC. 183 (1965); Richard B. Lillich, 
The Chase Impeachment, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 49 (1960); Adam A. Perlin, The Impeach-
ment of Samuel Chase: Redefining Judicial Independence, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 725 
(2010).  
 90. Chase once referred to his critics as “despicable Pimps, and Tools of Power, 
emerged from Obscurity and Basking in proprietary Sunshine.” Bair & Coblentz, supra 
note 89, at 368; see also Lillich, supra note 89, at 51 n.6. 
 91. See ELSMERE, supra note 20, at 2. For discussions of changes in Maryland poli-
tics during this time period, see RONALD HOFFMAN, A SPIRIT OF DISSENSION: ECONOM-
ICS, POLITICS, AND THE REVOLUTION IN MARYLAND (1973). 
 92. Bair & Coblentz, supra note 89, at 386. 
 93. See HAW, supra note 29, at 10, 13-14, 16, 22-23, 30; ELSMERE, supra note 20, at 
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Chase was a “huge man with a stentorian voice.”94 He was intem-
perate, had crude manners and little social polish, but he was also an 
early, vociferous opponent of the Stamp Act while serving his first 
term in the Maryland House of Delegates and later organized the col-
ony’s opposition to the Boston Port Act.95  He led the local chapter of 
the Sons of Liberty. Their demonstrations were so disruptive that the 
mayor of Annapolis complained that Chase was a “busy, restless in-
cendiary, a ring-leader of mobs, a foul-mouthed and inflaming son of 
discord.”96 Chase’s prominence and patriotism landed him a spot in 
Maryland’s delegation in the Continental Congress, where he advo-
cated independence from Great Britain long before many in Maryland 
were ready for an irrevocable break.97 In late June of 1776, he person-
ally scoured Maryland to line up support for independence at a time 
when the outcome of the vote remained uncertain. On July 1, 1776, an 
express rider brought John Adams a note—Chase had succeeded; Mar-
yland would vote yes.98   
After the outbreak of hostilities, Chase was intimately involved 
with virtually every phase of the war effort, including requisitioning 
supplies.99  Many of the things the army needed were difficult to come 
by and expensive given the rampant inflation wracking the new na-
tion.100 Congress also proved to be an inept administrator when it 
came to equipping and supplying the army. Naturally, most congres-
sional leaders placed the blame elsewhere. It was speculators and dis-
honorable members of the Commissary Department looking to profit 
from supplying the army who were causing the problems, or so many 
in Congress thought.101 Chase’s intimate familiarity with the army’s 
supply problems, along with his penchant for financial risk-taking, 
 
30. 
 94. ELSMERE, supra note 20, at 74. 
 95. See HAW, supra note 29, at 17-21, 42-43; see also HOFFMAN, supra note 91, at 50-
59; Bair & Coblentz, supra note 89, at 367-68. 
 96. Lillich, supra note 89, at 52 (internal quotations omitted). 
 97. See HAW, supra note 29, at 54-57; Bair & Coblentz, supra note 89, at 368. As late 
as May 21, 1776, Maryland representatives unanimously rejected independence. See 
HOFFMAN, supra note 91, at xiv. 
 98. CORNEL LENGYEL, FOUR DAYS IN JULY: THE STORY BEHIND THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 46 (1958); HAW, supra note 29, at 66-68. 
 99. See ELSMERE, supra note 20, at 12. 
 100. See generally ANNE BEZANSON, PRICES AND INFLATION DURING THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: PENNSYLVANIA, 1770-1790, at 10-23 (1951) (providing a detailed study of 
prices and inflation during the American Revolution). 
 101. See E. WAYNE CARP, TO STARVE THE ARMY AT PLEASURE: CONTINENTAL ARMY 
ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE, 1775-1783, at 37-38, 48-49, 55, 
101 (1984). Reports to Congress in 1777 detailed that several members of the Commis-
sary Department sought to fraudulently increase prices for their own financial benefit. 
Id. at 37-38. 
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would soon land him in the middle of what was, before his impeach-
ment from the Supreme Court, the worst scandal of his tumultuous 
career. 
On July 23, 1778, Jeremiah Wadsworth, a Connecticut merchant 
then serving as Commissary General for the Continental Army, was 
at George Washington’s headquarters in White Plains, New York.102 
In the camp, a detachment of 2,000 soldiers under the command of the 
Marquis de Lafayette, was preparing to depart on a bold undertak-
ing.103 Earlier that month, Comte Charles-Henri d’Estaing’s squadron 
of French ships had arrived in the United States, and Washington and 
the French leader plotted on where best to engage the British. New 
York was heavily occupied.  The French ships had the British fleet 
trapped in the harbor, but unfortunately French vessels drew too 
much water, making it impossible for them to attack. Washington and 
d’Estaing, therefore, fixed on a different objective—capturing the har-
bor at Newport, Rhode Island, which was currently under the control 
of Sir Robert Pigot and several thousand British and Hessian soldiers. 
By the first week of August, 10,000 Americans (a mixture of Continen-
tal soldiers and militia) had massed to the north near Providence while 
the French ships entered Narragansett Bay from the south.104 There 
was a lot riding on the plan. Washington hoped that this first joint 
operation would be an immediate success, striking a decisive blow 
against the British, and perhaps even prodding them to engage in se-
rious peace negotiations.105  
Wadsworth’s task was to make sure that the troops and their al-
lies were adequately provisioned, but that was proving increasingly 
difficult. New England was experiencing a severe grain shortage and 
 
 102. Letter from Jeremiah Wadsworth to Ephraim Blaine (Jul. 23, 1778), in 23 PA-
PERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, MISCELLANEOUS LETTERS TO CONGRESS, 1775-
1789, 513 [hereinafter PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS].  
 103. Lafayette’s Memoir of 1779 and Letter from George Washington to Lafayette 
(July 22, 1778), in II LAFAYETTE IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: SELECTED 
LETTERS AND PAPERS, 1776-1790, 13, 110-11 (Stanley J. Idzerda, ed., 1979) [hereinafter 
LAFAYETTE]. 
 104. SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH II, THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE: FROM 1760 TO 
THE SURRENDER AT YORKTOWN IN 1781, at 515-17, 519-22 (2002); ROBERT MID-
DLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1789, at 429-432 
(1982). 
 105. Unfortunately, this first attempt at American and French military cooperation 
failed. Rather than blockading Newport, d’Estaing chose instead to engage a contingent 
of British ships, a move that one historian characterized as “brave” but “excessively stu-
pid.” GRIFFITH, supra note 104, at 519. A strong gale severely damaged both fleets. The 
French promptly called off joint operations and sailed to Boston for repairs. With French 
naval support gone, the American militia began to desert in droves, severely reducing 
the American land forces. The remaining American troops withdrew and were lucky to 
escape Pigot’s counterattack. Id. at 515-17, 519-22; JONATHAN R. DULL, THE FRENCH 
NAVY AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY OF ARMS AND DIPLOMACY 1774-1787, at 
122-24 (1975). 
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an existing embargo prevented shipping wheat and flour from the mid-
dle or southern colonies.106 Wadsworth wrote to Ephraim Blaine, Dep-
uty Commissary General of Purchases, in Philadelphia with an urgent 
request—Blaine should immediately apply to Congress to have it req-
uisition flour in Virginia for shipment to the troops in Rhode Island. 
“[N]o time should be lost,” Wadsworth warned.107 A few days later, 
Congress received Wadsworth’s request and on July 31, 1778, referred 
it to a committee.108 
Chase was living reasonably well during the Revolutionary War, 
but his finances were tight. The war closed the courts and Chase’s po-
litical activities left his practice in shambles.109 With most of his time 
devoted to politics, he had little time for law and just as little income. 
Chase was hardly alone in this predicament—many delegates sought 
relief from public office so they could pursue profit making ventures.110 
Chase, however, took a different course. In June 1778, he formed a 
partnership with merchants John and Thomas Dorsey.111 Thomas 
Dorsey was the Continental Army’s purchasing agent for Baltimore 
County.112 The Dorseys were in charge of the day-to-day management 
of John Dorsey & Company, but Chase’s knowledge and influence in 
Maryland were indispensable.  Among other activities, the partner-
ship sold rum, cloth, and rope to the state and engaged in privateering 
raids against British ships.113 
 
 106. Lafayette complained of the shortages in several letters he wrote during the 
Rhode Island campaign. See, e.g., Letter from Lafayette to George Washington (July 28, 
1778), in LAFAYETTE, supra note 103, at 121. The Comte d’Estaing “express’d the great-
est anxiety” to Lafayette about how poorly provisioned his fleet was. Letter from Lafa-
yette to George Washington (Aug. 6, 1778), in LAFAYETTE, supra note 103, at 132-33. 
Washington had written Congress just a day earlier. He explained the French shortages 
and requested that Congress procure supplies in Philadelphia. Letter from George 
Washington to Henry Laurens (July 22, 1778), available at http://founders.ar-
chives.gov/documents/Washington/03-16-02-0144. 
 107. Letter from Jeremiah Wadsworth to Ephraim Blaine, in PAPERS OF THE CONTI-
NENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 102, at 513. Blaine was a civilian who served as an in-
termediary between Congress and the Commissary Department to address precisely 
these kinds of shortages. CARP, supra note 101, at 23. 
 108. LDC, supra note 27, at 626 n.1. The committee consisted of Governour Morris, 
Robert Morris, and Samuel Holten. July 31, 1778, in 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774-1778, at 734. 
 109. HAW, supra note 29, at 103. 
 110. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 287 
(1991) (“But too often America’s political leaders . . . had to retire not to relaxation in 
the leisure and solitude of a rural retreat but to the making of money in the busyness 
and bustle of a city law practice.”); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POL-
ITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 234-38 (1979). 
 111. HAW, supra note 29, at 104. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Samuel Chase, Censor Letters, MD. GAZETTE, Sept. 27, 1781 [hereinafter Chase, 
Sept. 27, 1781], at 1; HAW, supra note 29, at 104-05. 
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Now, with Wadsworth’s urgent request, a new business oppor-
tunity arose.  In early August, shortly after Congress received the re-
port from Wadsworth, Chase told John Dorsey and another man, John 
McClure, to start purchasing large amounts of wheat and flour.114 On 
August 24, Congress finally replied to Wadsworth.115 It approved his 
plan, but rather than limiting purchases to Virginia, Congress in-
structed him to purchase 20,000 barrels of flour in several states (in-
cluding Maryland) for shipment to New England.116 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Chase wrote Dorsey, urging him to increase his purchases.117 
Chase instructed Dorsey to “lose no time” and to buy more flour “as 
soon as possible.”118 Dorsey & Company eventually bought 7,000 bush-
els of wheat and 400 barrels of flour.119 In addition, McClure pur-
chased as much as 1,000 barrels of flour.120 
These were clearly not securities transactions and so the pur-
chases were not insider trading. Nonetheless, Chase’s scheme bears a 
striking similarity to United States v. O’Hagan121 and other modern 
misappropriation cases that arise in the context of hostile takeovers. 
In the modern case, the trader learns, either directly or indirectly from 
the acquirer, that the acquirer is about to announce its intention to 
purchase certain items (shares of the target corporation’s stock) in the 
marketplace. The effect of that announcement is easily predictable—
the price of those items will rise sharply. Before the announcement is 
made, the trader purchases the target’s shares and benefits from the 
 
 114. JOHN CADWALADER, TO THE PUBLIC. IT MAY APPEAR SOMEWHAT EXTRAORDINARY 
5-6 (1782) [hereinafter CADWALADER]. Although this appears to be the first recorded 
case in which Chase attempted to use congressional information for personal profit, he 
previously dispensed what would today be called political intelligence to help solidify his 
political position in Maryland. HOFFMAN, supra note 91, at 142-43. In 1775, Chase prom-
ised to keep Maryland politician and merchant Charles Ridgely apprised of congres-
sional actions so that Ridgely could adjust his business activities accordingly . Id. It is 
not clear if other members of Congress ever learned about these communications or if 
they considered them improper. There are, however, other examples during the Revolu-
tionary War of this kind of congressional tipping. See Edith B. Gelles, A Virtuous Affair: 
The Correspondence between Abigail Adams and James Lovell, 39 AM. Q. 252, 258 (1987) 
(describing how Lovell provided Adams with information she used in currency specula-
tion); see also infra notes 271-76 and accompanying text. These instances suggest the 
possibility that contemporary standards tolerated tipping while condemning actual 
trading. See infra notes 271-76 and accompanying text. 
 115. Aug. 24, 1778, in JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 108, at 
831. 
 116. Id. On August 26, Wadsworth was in Philadelphia and had still not received 
word on his request. He reiterated his desperate need for the supplies. Letter from Jer-
emiah Wadsworth to Henry Laurens (Aug. 26, 1778), in PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 102, at 537. 
 117. Letter from Henry Laurens to William Smith, in LDC, supra note 27, at 626 n.1. 
 118. CADWALADER, supra note 114, at 6. 
 119. Letter from Henry Laurens to William Smith, in LDC, supra note 27, at 626 n.1. 
 120. CADWALADER, supra note 114, at 5-6. 
 121. See 521 U.S. at 642. 
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resulting price increase.122 In both cases, a tangible economic harm can 
flow from the trader’s purchases. If the purchases are large enough 
they can increase the market price, potentially requiring the source of 
the information to pay more for the goods than they otherwise would 
if no trading had occurred. Similarly, the increased buying activity 
might itself tip off other market participants, again leading to in-
creased market prices. The insider trader, having made his purchases, 
now has an incentive to disclose the confidential information as 
quickly as possible so that he can reap his profit quickly and avoid any 
unnecessary market risks. This potentially creates a substantial con-
flict with the source of the information, which may want to keep its 
plans confidential for as long as possible.123   
Wadsworth and Blaine faced all of these problems when they ar-
rived in Maryland. It had been a bad growing year and flour was al-
ready in short supply.124 Speculators had recently snapped up what 
little was available in the market and prices were rising rapidly.125 
Speculative activity was so high that farmers and millers refused to 
sell to Wadsworth. “[N]o Contracts can be made with the Farmer for 
wheat, or the miller for flower [sic], by the purchasing Commissaries,” 
Wadsworth told Congress, “as a higher price is still expected and no 
publick [sic] officer thinks the States rich enough to keep pace with the 
Speculators.”126 Wadsworth was furious because merchants in Balti-
more already seemed to know about the congressional resolution even 
though no public announcement had been made.127 If the resolution 
had remained secret, Wadsworth reasoned, the provisions would have 
been easier and cheaper to purchase.128 By September 22, Washington 
 
 122. The same situation could arise in contexts other than hostile takeovers. For ex-
ample, in the classic case Brophy v. Cities Services, Inc., the confidential secretary for a 
corporate director bought company shares when he learned that the company was about 
to announce a stock repurchase plan. 70 A.2d 5, 7 (Del. Ch. 1949). 
 123. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 600-01 (2002). 
 124. Blaine reported that the crop yields were a one-third of what they had been in 
recent years. Memorial of Ephraim Blaine, in 3 PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS, MISC. PAPERS, 1770-1789, 195. 
 125. Letter from Jeremiah Wadsworth to Henry Laurens, in PAPERS OF THE CONTI-
NENTAL CONGRESS supra note 102, at 561-62 (“On my way to this place I found the usual 
Magazines were almost exhausted and but a non prospect of filling them again as every 
where there are Speculators purchasing wheat and Flower [sic]”); CADWALADER, supra 
note 114, at 23 (quoting Letter from Jeremiah Wadsworth to John Cadwalader (April 
1782)). 
 126. Letter from Jeremiah Wadsworth to Henry Laurens, in PAPERS OF THE CONTI-
NENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 102, at 561-62. 
 127. See ELSMERE, supra note 20, at 20. 
 128. HAW, supra note 29, at 106. These kinds of problems were not isolated to Balti-
more. Speculators were quite active in the commodities markets in the period 1777 to 
1781. Other government agents also reported that farmers would not sell them grain if 
they believed the market price was increasing. CARP, supra note 101, at 64-65. Like 
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complained that the provisions for the French fleet had still not ar-
rived.129 
Less than two weeks later, a congressional committee recom-
mended that Congress authorize the seizure of wheat and flour from 
anyone who appeared to have engrossed (i.e., monopolized) large 
amounts of those commodities.130 The price of wheat in Baltimore 
soared in response. On October 24, 1778, after Congress authorized 
grain seizures, Dorsey & Company sold its commodities to the Conti-
nental Army for a substantial profit.131  
IV. DID CHASE VIOLATE CONGRESSIONAL NORMS? CIVIC 
REPUBLICANISM DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 
It did not take long for members of Congress to suspect Chase’s 
role in the incident. Wadsworth reported that “it was publicly and 
freely said” in Baltimore that Chase was purchasing flour on specula-
tion and that Wadsworth’s mission “was known to everybody before 
[he] arriv[ed].”132 Chase’s first reaction was to deny that he had leaked 
the information, a rather clear indication that doing so would have 
been considered improper. Chase explained to Henry Laurens, the 
president of the Continental Congress, that he had written a letter to 
the governor of Maryland detailing Congress’s purchasing plans, but 
a local merchant and former congressional delegate named William 
Smith opened the letter and disclosed its contents to speculators.133 
When Laurens raised the matter with Smith, Smith vehemently de-
nied the allegation.134 His response reveals his understanding of the 
confidential nature of such congressional information and the breach 
that theft of the information entailed. Laurens had not revealed 
 
Wadsworth, those agents recognized the importance of secrecy in allowing the govern-
ment to buy necessary supplies at reasonable prices. Id. at 107. Whether Wadsworth 
would have found similar conditions in Baltimore even if Chase and his partners had 
not cornered the market is impossible to determine. Chase’s activities, however, surely 
did not make it any easier for Wadsworth to acquire the necessary supplies at a reason-
able price. 
 129. Letter from George Washington to Nathanael Greene (Sept. 22, 1778), FOUND-
ERS ONLINE, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/washing-
ton/03-17-02-0077. 
 130. HAW, supra note 29, at 106. 
 131. LDC, supra note 27, at 626 n.1. 
 132. See CADWALADER, supra note 114, at 23 (quoting Letter from Jeremiah 
Wadsworth to John Cadwalader (April 1782)). 
 133. Letter from Henry Laurens to William Smith (Sept. 12, 1778), in LDC, supra 
note 27, at 626. 
 134. See id. “I am astonished,” Smith wrote Laurens, “that any Gentleman . . . should 
insinuate or assert, That I ever oppened [sic] any letter Addressed to the Governor & 
Councill [sic], on the subject refered [sic] to, or even on any other . . . .  I do most solemnly 
declare, that, I never saw or heard of any letter to the Governor or Councill [sic] or Any 
member of Councill, giving information, respecting exportation of flour to the eastern 
states.” Id.  
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Chase’s name to Smith, who demanded information on his accuser. 
If such a declaration, so injurious to my character has been made in 
a public manner, I must beg, My Dear Sir that you will read . . . this 
letter in Congress. Otherwise if the declaration has been made in 
private to your Honor I would only request youll shew [sic] the Gent. 
My letter & if he will be kind enough to write me on the Subject, I 
will give him all the satisfaction in my power. For I do declare I do 
not even yet know with certainty to whom I am indebted for this 
groundless slander.135 
Smith’s language was a clear prelude to a duel, the culturally ap-
propriate response for a gentlemen accused of dishonorable conduct.136 
When Smith later wrote directly to Chase, Chase denied that he had 
ever accused Smith.137  
The Smith-Laurens exchange shows that theft of confidential in-
formation for personal gain was considered wrongful. Was the same 
true if a member of Congress was the culprit? Around the same time, 
delegate Henry Marchant confronted the Maryland delegation, accus-
ing one of them of disclosing Congress’s secret resolution.138 The usu-
ally combative Chase reportedly sat silently while the other delegates 
denied that they had disclosed the information.139 When Wadsworth 
returned to Philadelphia, he found no one willing to defend Chase’s 
conduct.  According to Wadsworth, Laurens and several other dele-
gates were “well convinced[] that Mr. Chase had made an ill use of the 
knowledge he had obtained by his seat in congress, and that he had 
divulged the resolution, which should have been kept secret.”140 
Wadsworth thought Chase’s actions were “unworthy and degrading to 
a man in his station.”141 
These comments suggest that Chase’s conduct was considered 
wrongful, but why was that so? As always, it is important not to im-
pose twenty-first century conceptions on attitudes that existed 230 
 
 135. Id.  
 136. See JOANNE FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW RE-
PUBLIC 174-77 (2001); see also KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW 
MORAL REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN 3-51 (2010). Laurens claimed later that he never believed 
Chase’s allegation. Laurens wrote Smith: “[F]rom the first moment I heard the intima-
tion alluded to, I treated it not only with discredit, but indignation, and expressed my 
feelings in the very instant to a particular friend. I know, said I, Mr. Smith’s honor and 
his discretion are never so unguarded, as this imputation seems to imply.” LDC, supra 
note 27, at 626 n.1.  
 137. Samuel Chase, Censor Letters, MD. GAZETTE, Aug. 23, 1781, at 1 [hereinafter 
Chase, Aug. 23, 1781]. 
 138. HAW, supra note 29, at 106. 
 139. Id.; Bair & Coblentz, supra note 89, at 369.  
 140. CADWALADER, supra note 114, at 23 (quoting Jeremiah Wadsworth to John Cad-
walader (April 1782)). 
 141. Id. at 24. 
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years ago. Was there something in particular about the cultural as-
sumptions and norms in the late eighteenth century that made 
Chase’s conduct improper? Wadsworth’s reference to Chase’s “station” 
certainly suggests such a possibility.142 Were those norms sufficiently 
at variance with contemporary norms that the any censure of Chase, 
while interesting, is largely irrelevant in evaluating the propriety of 
congressional insider trading today? 
Chase’s scheme was problematic on a number of levels. War prof-
iteering, especially coming, as it did, from a firebrand patriot, was par-
ticularly reprehensible. In the conspiratorial mindset of the time,143 
government officials were hyper-vigilant for any signs that corruption 
from the newly emerging “monied interest” was infecting the govern-
ment.144 Chase’s actions came against a backdrop in which members 
of Congress saw corruption everywhere in the ranks of the Commis-
sary Department—it was, they thought, the only explanation for the 
army’s chronic supply problems.145 Often it was an illusion, and much 
of the blame fell on Congress’s woeful inefficiencies.146 Still, the fear in 
Congress of corruption in supplying the army made profiteering by one 
of its own members particularly disturbing. 
Chase’s speculative vehicle—cornering flour—only made matters 
worse. Engrossing commodities had been illegal or at the very least 
immoral for centuries in Britain147 and had been a crime in some of 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
123 (1992); CARP, supra note 101, at 127 (noting that any attempt to profit from the war, 
even by private individuals, was considered immoral). 
 144. BAILYN, supra note 143, at 123. 
 145. See CARP, supra note 101, at 102. 
 146. Id. at 101-35. 
 147. In England in the 1500s, Chase’s scheme—buying flour in a market and then 
reselling it to purchasers in the same market would have been classified as “regrating.”  
STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL 
ROOTS, 1690-1860 15 (1998). Although it appears to have taken on the broader meaning 
of monopolization, “engrossing” technically referred to buying grain before the harvest 
for the purpose of reselling it afterward. Id. However characterized, Chase’s actions 
were unlawful under the common law and were statutory crimes by the mid-sixteenth 
century. See id.; see generally Wendell Herbruck, Forestalling, Regrating and Engross-
ing, 27 MICH. L. REV. 365 (1929) (discussing statutory enactments against forestalling, 
regrating, and engrossing). “The unpardonable sin,” wrote economic historian R. H. 
Tawney, “is that of the speculator or the middleman, who snatches private gain by the 
exploitation of public necessities.” R.H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 
36 (1962). Engrossers were “no better than common criminals.” Id. at 55 (internal cita-
tion omitted). Indeed, engrossing was not merely a regulatory crime, but was mala in 
se—a crime, like fraud, that was considered intrinsically wrong or evil. Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA 
L. REV. 863, 878 (2010). 
     Contemporary commentators obviously did not share modern conceptions of forward 
and future contracts as useful vehicles for shifting risk to those who could bear it more 
efficiently. Consequently, food speculation was widely criticized as raising prices with 
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the colonies for more than 100 years.148 With wartime shortages, the 
practice flourished, renewing public criticism and increasing enforce-
ment actions to curb it.149 Indeed, George Washington frequently de-
rided the practice and the overall decline in morality it evinced.150 
“Speculation, Peculation, Engrossing, forestalling with all their con-
comitants,” he wrote less than a year after Chase’s actions, “afford too 
many melancholy proofs of the decay of public virtue.”151   
Chase’s critics raised both war profiteering and engrossing as ex-
planations for why Chase had behaved dishonorably.152 Chase was the 
“prince of speculators and monopolizers” and his use of his “official 
knowledge as a member of congress” to engage in those activities en-
dangered “obtaining the necessary supplies for the army and navy.”153 
But, as this and Wadsworth’s comments suggested, it was the fact that 
a public official was using his privileged access to information that 
 
no offsetting benefits. See BANNER, supra, at 17-19.  Despite our more capacious notions 
of risk bearing, the rhetoric used in those times, which focused on the ability of specula-
tors to create artificial shortages and to profit on the misfortunes of others, is remarka-
bly similar to current market critiques. See id.  Despite wide condemnation of engrossers 
for their “wicked and unsatiable greediness” and their preference for “private gain above 
the public good,” food speculation was apparently widely practiced, perhaps because, as 
Banner speculates, it was performing its modern risk-shifting function even though con-
temporary observers could not see its utility. Id. at 18 (internal citation omitted). 
 148. BANNER, supra note 147, at 123. In 1718, Maryland even passed a law prohibit-
ing short-term speculation in commodities that looks remarkably like section 16(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits “short-swing” profits and which 
was the first federal law aimed at insider trading by corporate officers and directors. 15 
U.S.C. § 78p (2006); Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trad-
ing Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 308 n.18 (1998).  Under sec-
tion 16(b), directors, officers, and individuals who own ten percent or more of a corpora-
tion’s equity securities, are required to disgorge any profit from purchases and sales or 
sales and purchases made within a six-month period. See id. In order to curb commodi-
ties speculation, which was “mischievous and prejudicial” to the colony’s residents, the 
Maryland statute prohibited the purchase of goods or merchandise with the “Intent to 
sell the same again within the space of six Months.” BANNER, supra note 147, at 123 
(quoting THE LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND 36 (John D. Cushing ed., 1718)). 
 149. See BANNER, supra note 147, at 131. 
 150. See id. at 131-32. 
 151. Letter from George Washington to James Warren (Mar. 31, 1779), in 14 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 312 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931-41). Washington 
expressed severe disappointment in that same letter between the rhetoric of public vir-
tue thought necessary for success in a republic and the reality of human behavior during 
the war. “Cannot our common Country Am[erica] possess virtue enough to disappoint 
them?” he wrote. Id. “Is the paltry consideration of a little dirty pelf to individuals to be 
placed in competition with the essential rights and liberties of the present generation, 
and of Millions yet unborn? Shall a few designing men for their own aggrandizement, 
and to gratify their own avarice, overset the goodly fabric we have been rearing at the 
expence [sic] of so much time, blood, and treasure? and shall we at last become the vic-
tims of our own abominable lust of gain? Forbid it heaven!” Id. 
 152. See To Samuel Chase, Esquire, MD. GAZETTE, February 14, 1782, at 333. 
 153. Id. 
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made Chase’s actions particularly unsavory. At least that was the way 
Alexander Hamilton saw it. 
A. Alexander Hamilton and the “Decency and Respect” of the 
Government 
In the summer and fall of 1778, Alexander Hamilton, the future 
architect of the United States financial system, was serving as one of 
Washington’s aides-de-camp.154  He was just twenty-three, but Lieu-
tenant Colonel Hamilton had already garnered a reputation for bril-
liance, and he and Washington were developing what would prove to 
be a close and enduring bond.155 Working with the general, Hamilton 
had unfettered access to confidential military information, helped to 
organize the Newport campaign and, sometime that fall, learned from 
Henry Laurens and Jeremiah Wadsworth about Chase’s actions.156 
The scheme infuriated Hamilton, who had seen the piteous state of the 
army in Valley Forge earlier that year and who had written numerous 
pleas to Congress for additional supplies.157 Hamilton complained that 
Congress and the Board of War were maddeningly incompetent when 
it came to provisioning the army,158 but Chase’s scheme was far more 
serious. As his later fatal duel with Aaron Burr would demonstrate all 
too clearly, Hamilton had a particularly acute sense of honor.159  It was 
that sense of honor, and his willingness to attack political opponents 
 
 154. CHERNOW, supra note 24, at 83-125; see ROBERT W. WRIGHT & DAVID J. COWEN, 
FINANCIAL FOUNDING FATHERS: THE MEN WHO MADE AMERICA RICH 10-37 (2006). 
 155. CHERNOW, supra note 24, at 83-125. 
 156. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Patrick Dennis (July 16, 1778), in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 524-25; Letter from Alexander 
Hamilton to George Washington (July 20, 1778), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAM-
ILTON, supra note 25, at 525-26; Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington 
(July 23, 1778), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 527-28; 
Letter from George Washington to Continental Congress (July 22, 1778), in PAPERS OF 
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 102 (Hamilton “was well informed of our situ-
ation, and of my sentiments on every point”); see also CHERNOW, supra note 24, at 91 
(Washington called Hamilton his “principal and most confidential aide”) (quoting JAMES 
THOMAS FLEXNER, THE YOUNG HAMILTON 143 (1978)). 
 157. In one letter in Hamilton’s hand, Washington complained that the army’s com-
missary department was “more deplorable than you can easily imagine.” Letter from 
George Washington to William Livingston (Feb. 16, 1779), in 13 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 562 (Philander D. Chase et al. eds., 1985). In another, Washington at-
tributed the supply problems to negligence and mismanagement, not malfeasance. Let-
ter from George Washington to Patrick Henry (Feb. 19, 1778), in 13 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON 562 (Philander D. Chase et al. eds., 1985). 
 158. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton (Mar. 12, 1778), in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 439-42 (“[The] most melancholy 
truth [about the war was that] . . . the weakness of our councils will, in all probability, 
ruin us. Arrangements on which, the existence of the army depends, and almost the 
possibility of another campaign, are delayed in a most astonishing manner; and I doubt 
whether they will be adopted at all.”). 
 159. CHERNOW, supra note 24, at 714. 
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in the press, that provided Chase’s first public denunciation.  
In October and November, 1778, Hamilton wrote three slashing 
letters in the New-York Journal, and the General Advertiser.160 In his 
cover letter to the publisher, Hamilton explained his purpose. “There 
are abuses in the State,” Hamilton explained, “which demand an im-
mediate remedy. Important political characters must be brought upon 
the stage, and animadverted upon with freedom.”161 For Hamilton, de-
terring future “corrupt” conduct required exposing and publicly sham-
ing Chase. This kind of public rebuke was devastating to a man in 
Chase’s position. As historian Joanne Freeman noted when she wrote 
about eighteenth century affairs of honor: “Dishonor in print . . . did 
more than inflict pain in the present; it damned a man’s reputation for 
all time.”162 
The letters were, however, not just about dishonoring Chase. 
Hamilton wanted to “preserve the decency and respect” due the gov-
ernment.163 In Hamilton’s view, Chase’s scheme injured the govern-
ment not only because it was forced to pay higher prices for flour than 
it otherwise would, but because it brought the government into disre-
pute.  Chase made it much harder for citizens to believe that members 
of Congress were acting in their best interests, rather than simply try-
ing to line their own pockets. His scheme was a breach of trust because 
he had wounded the honor and dignity of the fledgling government.164 
Hamilton’s claim about the reputational harm to the government 
is directly linked to modern arguments about the harm that poten-
tially flows from congressional insider trading. Just like Hamilton, 
modern commentators believe that such trading is improper as a nor-
mative matter because it “undermines the public’s trust and confi-
dence in the government.”165 Reputational harm to the corporation has 
also been offered as a justification for the ban on more conventional 
forms of insider trading.166 Although it is not necessary to show harm 
 
 160. Alexander Hamilton, Publius Letter I, in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON, supra note 25, at 562-63; ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Publius Letter II, in 1 THE PAPERS 
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 567-70; ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Publius 
Letter III, in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 580-82. 
 161. Alexander Hamilton, Publius Letter I, in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMIL-
TON, supra note 25, at 562-63. 
 162. FREEMAN, supra note 136, at 158. 
 163. Alexander Hamilton, Publius Letter II, in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMIL-
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in negotiating a prisoner exchange with the British. He worried that if he did not nego-
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 164. Cf. CARP, supra note 101, at 101 (“The suspicion of corruption acted as a corro-
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 165. Nagy, supra note 12, at 1133.  
 166. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969). 
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to the principal in order to obtain an accounting from an agent who 
has used the principal’s confidential information to earn a personal 
profit,167 the New York Court of Appeals in Diamond v. Oreamuno held 
that insider trading might result in reputational harm to the corpora-
tion.168 That theory is controversial, with many commentators sug-
gesting that reputational harm to the corporation is far too speculative 
a basis upon which to impose potential criminal liability for insider 
trading.169 But even those critics agree that the reputational harm to 
the government is far clearer and provides a sufficient normative jus-
tification for banning congressional insider trading.170 Thus, although 
over two centuries separate Chase’s scheme from the modern debate 
over congressional insider trading, the normative justifications for 
considering the conduct improper are identical. 
In his published letters, Hamilton used the pseudonym “Pub-
lius,”171 the same name he would later use—along with James Madi-
son and John Jay—in The Federalist Papers.172 Pen names were in-
tended to have a symbolic resonance with contemporary readers, and 
Publius was no exception. Hamilton was using the name of Publius 
Valerius Publicola (“friend of the people”),173 one of four Roman aristo-
crats who overthrew the monarchy and in its place established the Ro-
man Republic. In Plutarch’s Lives (a book widely read among eight-
eenth century political leaders and a particular favorite of Hamil-
ton’s),174 Publius was praised for speaking “boldly on the side of jus-
tice” and for his efforts in thwarting a plot to destroy the nascent re-
public.175 The choice also contained a pointed jab at the grasping 
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Chase. The wealthy Publius lived in a splendid house overlooking the 
Forum.176 Learning that Romans were envious and resentful of his 
home, he hired workmen to tear it down to its foundations.177 The Ro-
mans admired his magnanimity and built him a new house of “more 
moderate proportions.”178 Here was a man, Hamilton implied, who 
would, unlike Chase, abjure luxury for the good of the country.  
To fully appreciate Hamilton’s critique and the general reaction 
to Chase’s “corrupt” actions, it is crucial to understand that Roman 
history was at once an inspiration, a model, and a cautionary tale for 
the leaders who were at the heart of the struggle with Great Britain. 
Americans at the time placed an enormous importance on “disinter-
ested virtue,” a concept they derived from an idealized version of the 
Roman Republic as well as from the writings of Machiavelli, Montes-
quieu, and England’s seventeenth century “commonwealth men” and 
radical Whigs.179 American writings demonstrated a nostalgic and na-
ïve belief in an earlier age “full of virtue: simplicity, patriotism, integ-
rity, a love of justice and of liberty.”180 The obsession with virtue, the 
widely shared belief that Great Britain had fallen into a state of per-
vasive corruption, and the expectation that the new republic needed to 
avoid the same corruption if it were to endure were “neither manipu-
lated propaganda nor borrowed empty abstractions, but ideas with 
real personal and social significance for those who used them.”181 In-
deed, historian Gordon Wood has argued that “[n]o generation in 
American history has ever been so self-conscious about the moral and 
social values necessary for public leadership.”182 For Wood, “[t]he re-
publican revolution was the greatest utopian movement in American 
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history . . . . [Its leaders] sought to construct a society and government 
based on virtue and disinterested public leadership and to set in mo-
tion a moral movement that would eventually be felt around the 
globe.”183 
Talk of virtue and its critical importance in republican govern-
ments was everywhere in the writings of the revolutionary generation. 
Thomas Paine warned in Common Sense that “when republican vir-
tues fail, slavery ensues.”184 For John Adams, virtue was absolutely 
foundational for erecting a government designed to produce the great-
est possible happiness among the greatest portion of the population. 
For a republic to succeed, “[t]here must be a possitive [sic] Passion for 
the public good” that is “Superiour to all private Passions. Men must 
be ready, they must pride themselves, and be happy to sacrifice their 
private Pleasures, Passions, and Interests, nay their private Friend-
ships and dearest Connections, when they Stand in Competition with 
the Rights of society.”185 What could be a clearer breach of this obliga-
tion to prefer the public over the private than Chase’s misuse of confi-
dential information? 
America, after all, was supposed to be different from corrupt Brit-
ain. It was easy for Americans, at least in the years before Chase and 
other instances of war profiteering, to believe in their own exception-
alism. In 1765, John Adams wrote that “America was designed by 
Providence for the Theatre on which Man was to make his true figure, 
on which science, Virtue, Liberty, Happiness and Glory were to exist 
in Peace.”186 Charles Carroll, writing in the same year, thought that 
corruption might one day infect America, but predicted that it was still 
far off into the future. And so he advised a friend to sell his estate in 
England and to:  
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purchase lands in this province where liberty will maintain her em-
pire till a dissoluteness of morals, luxury, and venality shall have 
prepared the degenerate sons of some future age to prefer their own 
mean lucre, the bribes, and the smiles of corruption and arbitrary 
ministers to patriotism, to glory, and to the public weal. No doubt 
the same causes will produce the same effects, and a period is al-
ready set to the reign of American freedom; but that fatal time seems 
to be at a great distance. The present generation at least, and I hope 
many succeeding ones, in spite of a corrupt Parliament, will enjoy 
the blessings and the sweets of liberty.187  
Ten years later, Benjamin Franklin, then in Great Britain, compared 
“the extreme corruption prevalent among all orders of men in this old 
rotten state” with “the glorious public virtue so predominant in our 
rising country . . . .”188 
They would, the revolutionary leaders thought, need all of that 
virtue if they were to survive. Governmental corruption was an exis-
tential threat to republican societies, which by their nature were in-
credibly fragile polities.189 From Montesquieu, the revolutionaries 
learned that successful republics tended to be small in size and largely 
homogenous, creating even more danger for the far-flung and diverse 
United States.190 Given the fragility of republics and the widespread 
view that no republic on the scale of the United States had ever suc-
ceeded, it was not surprising that citizens would be hyper-vigilant for 
signs of governmental wrongdoing. 
The ideal public servant embodied all the attributes of disinter-
ested civic republicanism. Indeed, virtuous civil servants were sup-
posed to serve as a model for all citizens, who in time would conform 
their behavior to those ideals.191 The key to public virtue was the will-
ingness to forego private desires for the public interest.192 Unlike the 
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courtiers of Europe, who were driven by avarice, gentlemen were sup-
posed to serve in government without any compensation.193 Such ser-
vice was thought to be a personal sacrifice and an obligation that the 
elite owed due to their privileged positions and education.194 For Wash-
ington, public service was supposed to entail “[e]xpense and trouble 
without the least prospect of gain.”195 The ideal republican legislator 
was a man of leisure—someone who did not work and could therefore 
engage in government service with complete disinterest. Virtue re-
quired that government officials be free “from the petty interests of the 
marketplace.”196 
It was from this vantage—of a dominant and thoroughgoing civic 
republicanism as an essential attribute and necessary condition for 
the successful American experiment—from which Hamilton character-
ized Chase’s conduct as the kind of “prostitution” which should be “im-
mortalised in infamy.”197 Hamilton began his first letter with a cri-
tique of the evils of war profiteering in general, and he did not limit 
his condemnation to those in public positions. The individuals who 
“carried the spirit of monopoly and extortion to an excess” were prin-
cipally responsible for the exorbitant prices gripping the country, and 
their activities reflected poorly on the potential longevity of the United 
States. Mirroring the prevailing ethos of civic republicanism, Hamil-
ton wrote that “[w]hen avarice takes the lead in a State, it is commonly 
the forerunner of its fall. How shocking [it is] to discover among our-
selves, even at this early period, the strongest symptoms of this fatal 
disease.”198 
War profiteers were worthy of “contempt,” Hamilton wrote, but 
when Chase used confidential information garnered through his posi-
tion as a member of Congress for his own personal gain, it constituted 
a far worse betrayal of trust.199  
But when a man, appointed to be the guardian of the State, and the 
depository of the happiness and morals of the people—forgetful of the 
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solemn relation, in which he stands—descends to the dishonest arti-
fices of a mercantile projector, and sacrifices his conscience and his 
trust to pecuniary motives; there is no strain of abhorrence, of which 
the human mind is capable, nor punishment, the vengeance of the 
people can inflict, which may not be applied to him, with justice. If 
it should have happened that a Member of C[ongre]ss has been this 
degenerate character, and has been known to turn the knowledge of 
secrets to which his office gave him access, to the purposes of private 
profit . . . he ought to feel the utmost rigor of public resentment, and 
be detested as a traitor of the worst and most dangerous kind.200 
Government officials, in other words, were held to a higher stand-
ard than members of the general public. They had a duty not to use 
confidential information for private gain, a duty that was essential to 
preserving the fledgling nation. In a world in which all citizens, but 
especially public officials, were supposed to act with honor and virtue, 
Chase’s conduct was treasonous. Chase’s lot for “engaging in a traffic 
infamous in itself, repugnant to your station, and ruinous to your coun-
try” was “to have the peculiar privilege of being universally des-
pised.”201 In short, in what seemed to be the first case of a member of 
Congress taking information for personal gain, contemporaries 
deemed the action as a violation of a duty owed both to the American 
people and to the United States government, precisely the same duty 
the STOCK Act purported for the first time to enshrine into law 234 
years later. 
Despite his behavior, even Chase professed to adhere to the tenets 
of civic republicanism that Hamilton now accused him of violating. In 
a letter to James Duane in 1775, Chase had even expressed the kind 
of jaundiced critique of Parliament that Hamilton now leveled at 
Chase. 
[W]hen I reflect on the enormous Influence of the Crown, [and] the 
System of Corruption introduced as the Art of Government . . . I have 
not the least Dawn of Hope in the Justice, Humanity, Wisdom or 
Virtue of the British Nation. I consider them as one of the most aban-
don[e]d [and] wicked People under the Sun.202 
Chase condemned members of Parliament “who as openly traffic 
their Integrity & Honor” and who “no longer regard even the Appear-
ance of Virtue.”203 To underscore that point, Chase helped to re-draft 
Maryland’s constitution, which provided, among other things: “That 
all persons invested with the legislative or executive powers of govern-
ment are the trustees of the public, and, as such, accountable for their 
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conduct . . . .”204 
Perhaps it was that hypocrisy that led Hamilton in his second 
Publius letter to level what was mostly an ad hominem attack on 
Chase, although he also provided a bit more factual detail about 
Chase’s scheme.205 For example, according to Hamilton, Chase had, 
through “intrigues and studied delays” protracted congressional deci-
sion-making on Wadsworth’s request in order to give his business part-
ners time to corner the market.206 Hamilton also charged that Chase’s 
purchases had doubled the price the government was forced to pay for 
flour207—a tangible economic injury that only made Chase’s breach of 
trust worse. 
In his third letter, however, Hamilton expanded on the notion that 
members of Congress owed a duty to the citizens of the country, a duty 
which precluded them from using their office for financial gain. “The 
station of a member of C[ongres]s,” Hamilton wrote, “is the most illus-
trious and important of any I am able to conceive.”208 
A man of virtue and ability, dignified with so precious a trust, would 
rejoice that fortune had given him birth at a time, and placed him in 
circumstances so favourable for promoting human happiness. He 
would esteem it not more the duty, than the privilege and ornament 
of his office, to do good to mankind; from this commanding eminence, 
he would look down with contempt upon every mean or interested 
pursuit.209 
Invoking the then prevalent hostility toward any kind of financial 
speculation, Hamilton observed that an honorable member of Con-
gress  
would not allow his attention to be diverted . . . to intrigue for per-
sonal connections, to confirm his own influence; nor would [he] be 
able to reconcile it, either to the delicacy of his honour, or to the dig-
nity of his pride, to confound in the same person the representative 
of the Commonwealth, and the little member of the trading com-
pany.210 
Hamilton’s third letter closed with a prediction that Chase’s “av-
arice” would be fatal to his “ambition.” “I have too good an opinion of 
the sense and spirit, to say nothing of the virtue of your countrymen, 
to believe they will permit you any longer to abuse their confidence, or 
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trample upon their honour.”211 Hamilton advised Chase to resign from 
Congress rather than face “the ignominy of a formal dismission.”212 To 
Hamilton, Chase’s political career had been one long charade. “It is 
time,” Hamilton advised, to “lay aside the mask of patriotism, and as-
sert your station among the honorable tribe of speculators and projec-
tors.”213 
B. The Fallout from the Flour Scandal 
When Chase returned to Maryland, it was clear that members of 
the state government viewed his actions as both wrongful and a sub-
stantial breach of trust. In the wake of the scandal, the Maryland leg-
islature revoked Chase’s appointment to Congress “on the current re-
port of his being a speculator.”214 The Maryland General Assembly also 
passed an act restricting delegates from engaging in any foreign or do-
mestic trade.215 Most observers viewed it as being designed to prevent 
Chase from representing Maryland in the future.216 In the instructions 
the state issued to its delegates that December, it told them not to 
combine with “monopolizers and engrossers of the necessaries of 
life.”217 The delegates had a duty “to be watchful each one over the 
conduct of the other” so as to expose any dishonorable practices.218 Like 
Hamilton, Maryland’s instructions to its new delegates emphasized 
how their misbehavior could harm the reputation of the new govern-
ment. 
You must be fully sensible, gentlemen, that it is of the utmost im-
portance, the people at large should entertain the highest opinion of 
the integrity and wisdom of congress; if either should be questioned, 
the respect due to that assembly, and hitherto paid to it, will dimin-
ish; and in proportion to that diminution it will lose of its dignity and 
influence. Delegates to congress, therefore, ought not only to be hon-
est, but free from the imputation of dishonesty.219 
Impliedly, Chase’s misappropriation of confidential congressional in-
formation for personal profit had already led to that kind of reputa-
tional harm. The state also passed an act authorizing the seizures of 
grain from engrossers and ordering engrossers of grain bound over for 
trial.220  
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Chase’s conduct put an end to his increasingly strained relation-
ship with another prominent Maryland politician, Charles Carroll of 
Carrollton.221 Both men were lawyers, Maryland delegates to the Con-
tinental Congress, and staunch revolutionaries, but that is where the 
similarities ended.222 Carroll was every bit the aristocrat, a prominent 
member of Maryland’s landed gentry who prided himself on his self-
discipline, integrity, and strict code of honor.223 Carroll, like other rev-
olutionary leaders, feared corruption and praised virtue, and he dis-
dained those who sought to profit from government positions at the 
expense of the people they represented.224 
Though they had been allies in pushing Maryland to assent to in-
dependence from Britain, Carroll thought Chase’s conduct warranted 
a stronger rebuke. Carroll proposed the following language: 
Reports have circulated, much to the disadvantage of some of the 
delegates; they have been accused of combining with the monopoliz-
ers and engrossers of the necessities of life, and sharing in iniquitous 
gain. The resolves of Congress . . . to check those pernicious practices, 
will lose much of their efficacy and force, while members of their own 
body, under the suspicion of the same guilt, are suffered to retain 
their seats in that assembly.225 
The House of Delegates, “where Chase still had many friends,” excised 
the language, which had deeply offended Chase.226 “The malice of en-
emies,” Chase wrote, “may be forgiven, but it requires some time to 
forget the ungenerous perfidious conduct of false friends.”227 
Chase, however, was hardly chastened in his desire to use his pub-
lic position for private profit. A little over a year later, Chase was re-
portedly involved in a scheme to purchase depreciated state loan cer-
tificates.228 Still a member of the House of Delegates, he then added a 
provision to a bill that would require the state to redeem the certifi-
cates at full value, creating a windfall for himself.229 Carroll told his 
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father that Chase was “the most prostitute scoundrel, who ever ex-
isted.”230 In the rhetoric of late eighteenth century America, it is hard 
to imagine a sharper rebuke of a gentleman.231 
C. The Flour Scandal Revived 
Chase maintained his silence on the flour scandal for three years.  
In 1781, the Maryland law prohibiting delegates from engaging in 
commerce expired and Chase wanted both to resume his seat in Con-
gress and to clear his name.232 Using the pseudonym “Censor,” he be-
gan publishing letters in the Maryland Gazette, which although osten-
sibly focused on state political issues, implicitly called into question 
the charges in the flour scandal.233 It was, Chase argued, “the constant 
practice of our open enemies, and our internal secret foes, to raise dis-
trust and suspicion of those entrusted with the conduct of our af-
fairs.”234 Chase quickly began a direct refutation of the charges against 
him, which he blamed on “new patriots” trying to further their own 
political careers.235 Chase had given many years of honorable and pat-
riotic service, “without receiving (or wishing to receive) any reward.”236 
The charges lodged against him “were false and infamous, and the au-
thor was a calumniator and a villain.”237  
What is noteworthy about Chase’s defense, at least from the per-
spective of determining the institutional norms that prevailed in Con-
gress at the time, is his admission that the charged conduct consti-
tuted a significant breach of trust.238 While he would later argue that 
the information concerning Congress’s plan to purchase flour for the 
army was not secret,239 he never tried to argue that it was permissible 
for a member of Congress to use confidential information for personal 
profit.240 Such conduct was, he admitted, “infamous.”241 He readily con-
ceded that if he had “betrayed the secrets of congress, and made use of 
 
 230. Id. (citing Letter from Carroll of Carrollton to Carroll of Annapolis (May 6, 11, 
1780)). 
 231. See FREEMAN, supra note 136, at xvi. When a political rival called Carroll’s fa-
ther a scoundrel, Carroll challenged him to a duel. HOFFMAN, supra note 91, at 108-09. 
 232. ELSMERE, supra note 20, at 21; see generally Chase, Sept. 27, 1781, supra note 
113, at 1. 
 233. See generally Chase, Sept. 27, 1781, supra note 113, at 1-2. 
 234. Id. at 1.  
 235. Samuel Chase, Censor Letters, M.D. GAZETTE, June 21, 1781, at 1, quoted in 
HAW, supra note 29, at 109. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. at 2. 
 240. See id. at 1. 
 241. Id. at 2. 
372 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 67:335 
the knowledge he acquired as a member of that body, to his own pri-
vate emolument” it would constitute serious “misconduct.”242 The 
charges, however, were simply untrue, and he had never been given 
an opportunity to refute them.243   
Chase’s erstwhile ally Charles Carroll was not convinced.  Should 
“a man talk of virtue, liberty and patriotism,” he wrote his father, “who 
betrayed the secrets of Congress?”244 Carroll offered a more extensive 
response in the pages of the Maryland Gazette. Little had changed in 
his view of Chase’s conduct. For Carroll, it remained a “breach of pub-
lic trust.”245 A newspaper battle between the two ensued, but Chase’s 
responses never denied the impropriety of the alleged conduct. In-
stead, after launching an ad hominem attack on Carroll,246 Chase ad-
mitted for the first time that he had instructed his partners to buy 
flour in the summer of 1778.247 Those instructions, however, did not 
flow from “any knowledge acquired as a member of congress, but from 
facts publicly known to every merchant in America.”248  Chase, in other 
words, argued that the information was already public, a defense com-
mon to almost all modern insider trading cases.249 
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those defenses actually met the charges against Chase. Disclosure of the resolution was 
not the issue—it was capitalizing on his knowledge that Congress was likely to engage 
in substantial purchases. Knowledge of grain shortages in New England and the arrival 
of the French fleet is one thing—knowledge that the government is likely to enter an-
other market (the middle Atlantic states), make significant purchases that were likely 
to raise demand and prices there, and ship those purchases to New England, a practice 
that would violate existing trade embargoes, was another thing entirely. Chase’s last 
defense conflates market manipulation and insider trading. Profiting from confidential 
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The public back and forth between Chase and Carroll eventually 
led to a hearing in the Maryland House of Delegates to determine 
whether Chase had betrayed a secret resolve of Congress.250 John Cad-
walader, a former brigadier general in the Pennsylvania militia and a 
close confidant of George Washington, led the effort.251 Cadwalader 
charged that Chase’s “breach of trust . . . in high office” was “shameful 
and infamous” and that such a great crime “deserved the most exem-
plary punishment,” banishment from the state.252 Although the rheto-
ric was clearly overwrought, Cadwalader, like Hamilton, focused on 
the reputational harm that would occur to Congress if such practices 
were permitted to flourish. 
What would the world think of congress (as the first representative 
body of America) if every member of that assembly was known to be, 
in point of character, what they only suspect Mr. Chase to be? Would 
the world entertain the highest opinion of the integrity of congress? 
Would not congress, by being composed of such men, lose that dignity 
and influence which it has hitherto supported? Could it be said with 
truth, that such delegates were not only honest, but free, even from 
the IMPUTATION of dishonesty? . . . An assembly composed of such 
men could, in my opinion, possess neither DIGNITY or INFLUENCE 
[sic].253 
Just as Hamilton had,254 Cadwalader emphasized the loss of dignity 
for the institution, a position that links directly to the modern concep-
tions of the harm arising from congressional insider trading.255 
Cadwalader added, however, a new twist on the reputational 
harm that could arise from such trading. For Cadwalader, allowing 
members to exploit this kind of information would create enormous 
inequalities in the marketplace. “His official knowledge,” Cadwalader 
wrote, “will give him an advantage over petty adventurers.”256 This was 
an unerodible advantage because the information “can only be known 
 
information did not require that Chase’s purchases drive up prices. It was enough to 
anticipate the significant price increases that would arise once the government began 
its buying program. Nor did Chase’s defense address the reputational harm to Congress 
and to the United States from the scheme. 
 250. MARYLAND HOUSE OF DELEGATES, FRIDAY JANUARY 11, 1781, GENERAL CADWAL-
ADER HAVING MADE THE FOLLOWING MOTION 1 (1782). [hereinafter MARYLAND HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES]. 
 251. Id.; HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, CADWALADER FAMILY PAPERS 1-3 
(2007), available at http://hsp.org/sites/default/files/legacy_files/migrated/find-
ingaid1454cadwaladerpart1.pdf.  
 252. John Cadwalader, To the Printers of the Maryland Gazette, MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 
3, 1782, at 322. 
 253. CADWALADER, supra note 114, at 20-21 (alteration in original) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 154-213. 
 255. See CADWALADER, supra note 114, at 20-21. 
 256. Id. at 19. 
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by members of congress.”257 Cadwalader foresaw a somewhat different 
form of corruption than Hamilton articulated, but one that would 
harm the dignity and integrity of the government just as severely—
members of Congress could sell information to the highest bidder.258 
Anticipating the modern political intelligence industry, Cadwalader 
wrote that those “who have not the means of obtaining that infor-
mation . . . will not be at a loss to whom to apply.”259  
The strong circumstantial evidence and Chase’s lack of credibility 
from his ever-shifting explanations should have led to a finding that 
Chase had acted improperly. By a 36-2 vote, however, the House of 
Delegates found that “Chase was not guilty of a breach of his duty, as 
a member of Congress, by revealing a secret resolve of that assem-
bly.”260 It was hardly a resounding vindication. The legislature found 
only that Chase did not improperly disclose the resolution—it said 
nothing about whether he had used his early knowledge of that reso-
lution to personally profit from it. Nor was the ruling much of a sur-
prise. During that time period, Chase continued to wield enormous in-
fluence in the House of Delegates. A finding in Chase’s favor was very 
much a foregone conclusion.261 More fundamentally, even if Chase 
were innocent of the charges, the legislature was clear that disclosing 
confidential congressional information was a breach of duty. 
Privately, it seemed, even Chase knew that he had abused his po-
sition. In 1786 he warned his sons that they should “[n]ever seek to 
acquire power or property from a public station.” In fact, it would be 
better if they avoided public service altogether, “unless you are fully 
convinced that your services are really necessary to promote the good 
of your country.”262 
V. HAS THE CONGRESSIONAL NORM PROHIBITING MISAPPROPRIATION 
SURVIVED?  
A. Public Virtue, Public Debt, and Peace Talks  
Civic virtue quickly proved to be a rather shaky foundation on 
which to construct a new republic, as some political leaders had 
warned. Chase’s colleague in Congress, Carter Braxton, was skeptical 
from the start that the patriotic fervor of the years leading up to the 
Declaration of Independence was sustainable. Public virtue, he wrote 
 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. MARYLAND HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 250, at 1. 
 261. Years later John Quincy Adams wrote that Chase “had for some years almost 
uncontrolled dominion over the politics of the State of Maryland.” John Quincy Adams 
(Dec. 18, 1820), in THE DIARY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 1794-1824 247 (Allan Nevins ed., 
Charles Scribner’s Sons 1951) (1928). 
 262. HAW, supra note 29, at 127.  
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in 1776, “a disinterested attachment to the public good, exclusive and 
independent of all private and selfish interest . . . though sometimes 
possessed by a few individuals, never characterised the mass of people 
in any state.”263 Even John Adams had his doubts. Just a few months 
before he wrote Thoughts on Government, in which he argued that vir-
tue was indispensable in a true republic, Adams despaired over 
whether a long-lasting republic in America was possible: “[T]here is so 
much Rascallity [sic], so much Venality and Corruption, so much Ava-
rice and Ambition such a Rage for Profit and Commerce among all 
Ranks and Degrees of Men even in America,” he wrote, “that I some-
times doubt whether there is public Virtue enough to Support a Re-
public.”264 Just a few years after his Publius letters, even Hamilton 
abandoned the idea that widespread virtue among the populace was 
possible.265 
Braxton thought that abnegation of prosperity and rejection of 
ambition and interest were antithetical to the burgeoning commercial-
ism and mercantilism in the colonies, and the early years of the war 
proved him correct.266 In the social, political, and economic upheaval 
of the Revolutionary War, as farmers, merchants, and artisans sought 
to profit from the increasing demand for their products, civic virtue 
among the populace often seemed in short supply. According to Gordon 
Wood: 
Instead of becoming a new and grand incarnation of ancient Rome, 
a land of virtuous and contented farmers, America within decades of 
the Declaration of Independence had become a sprawling, material-
istic, and licentious popular democracy unlike any state that had 
ever existed. Buying and selling were celebrated as never before, and 
 
 263. Carter Braxton, An Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient Domin-
ion of Virginia: On the Subject of Government in General, and Recommending a Partic-
ular Form to Their Consideration (1776), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 
184, at 670, 671; see also WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra 
note 110, at 229 (“But the ink on the Declaration of Independence was scarcely dry be-
fore many of the revolutionary leaders began expressing doubts about the possibility of 
realizing these high hopes [for a republic of virtue]. The American people seemed inca-
pable of the degree of virtue needed for republicanism.”). 
 264. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (Jan. 8, 1776), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 184, at 669, 669. 
 265. See Alexander Hamilton, Contintentalist, No. 6 (July 4, 1782) in 1 THE FOUND-
ERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 184, at 670, 671, 673 (“We may preach till we are tired 
of the theme, the necessity of disinterestedness in republics, without making a single 
proselyte. The virtuous declaimer will neither persuade himself nor any other person to 
be content with a double mess of porridge, instead of a reasonable stipend for his ser-
vices. We might as soon reconcile ourselves to the Spartan community of goods and 
wives, to their iron coin, their long beards, or their black broth. There is a total dissim-
ulation in the circumstances, as well as the manners, of society among us; and it is as 
ridiculous to seek for models in the simple ages of Greece and Rome, as it would be to 
go in quest of them among the Hottentots and Laplanders.”). 
 266. See Braxton, supra note 263, at 672.  
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the antique meaning of virtue was transformed. Ordinary people 
who knew no Latin and had few qualms about disinterestedness be-
gan asserting themselves with a new vigor in the economy and in 
politics. Far from sacrificing their private desires for the good of the 
whole, Americans of the early Republic came to see that the individ-
ual pursuit of wealth and happiness (the two were now interchange-
able) was not only inevitable but justifiable as the only proper basis 
for a free state.267 
The republic of virtue was dead before it ever really began. 
The rapidly waning belief in the foundational role of virtue in the 
United States raises an important question about whether the institu-
tional norms prohibiting members of Congress from exploiting confi-
dential information for personal gain survived the Revolutionary War. 
Many of the complaints about the absence of virtue were, to be sure, 
directed at the populace at large, rather than members of Congress.268 
But when Americans abandoned civic republicanism in the decades 
following the war,269 did Congress similarly abandon any restraint on 
its members’ use of inside information?  
To answer that question fully, one would ideally want to trace 
other episodes throughout the history of Congress to determine 
whether there was any apparent change in institutional norms over 
time. Unfortunately, that kind of extensive analysis, which would un-
doubtedly reveal some instances of questionable behavior, is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Instead, this section offers sketches of two 
episodes, one close in time to the Chase flour scandal and the other 
more than a century later, which together suggest something about 
the continuity of those early institutional norms. 
On January 14, 1790, the first Treasury Secretary, Alexander 
Hamilton, submitted a lengthy Report on Public Credit to Congress, 
in which he proposed that the federal government assume all of the 
debt the national and state governments had incurred during the rev-
olution.270 The various notes and certificates were trading at steep dis-
counts from face value, but Hamilton, in order to establish the credit-
worthiness of the new nation, proposed to pay it off in full to the cur-
rent holders through notes issued by the new federal government.271 
While many in Congress agreed that the country should fund the debt, 
some objected that the plan would create a windfall for speculators (a 
suspect class in 1790).272 The price of debt certificates rose steadily in 
 
 267. WOOD, THE IDEA OF AMERICA, supra note 181, at 75. 
 268. See id. 
 269. See id. 
 270. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1789-1815, at 95-98 (2009); WRIGHT & COWEN, supra note 154, at 21-22. 
 271. See WRIGHT & COWEN, supra note 154, at 22-23. 
 272. See Whitney K. Bates, Northern Speculators and Southern State Debts: 1790, 19 
WM. & MARY Q. 30, 30 (1962) (“In Congress and in the press, Hamilton’s opponents 
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the months before Hamilton released his report based, in part, on a 
widespread belief that the federal government would fund the debt.273 
But there were also leaks. The primary culprit seems to have been 
Hamilton’s First Assistant Treasury Secretary, William Duer, who not 
only disclosed information about the funding plan but also joined with 
other New York traders to purchase state securities in the weeks be-
fore and after Hamilton released his report.274 
 
loudly complained that such securities as had not already passed from the hands of their 
original owners were now being bought up at bargain rates by a band of speculators 
taking advantage of inside information and the ignorance of the owners.”). Analysis of 
transfer records shows that the vast majority of the debt issued by several southern 
states was concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of northern specula-
tors. See generally id. But not all of this concentration represented recent speculative 
activity. See E. James Ferguson, Public Finance and the Origins of Southern Sectional-
ism, 28 J. S. HIST. 450, 454 (1962) (noting that most of the southern states’ debt was 
originally issued to northern purchasers).  
     As a result, James Madison and other congressmen supported what was known as 
discrimination. See WRIGHT & COWEN, supra note 154, at 23.  Current holders would be 
paid only the depreciated market value of the certificates. See CHERNOW, supra note 24, 
at 305. In other words, they would be made whole but would not profit from their pur-
chases. The remainder of the face value of the certificates, it was argued, should go to 
the original holders of the debt, generally soldiers, widows, and small farmers, who were 
deemed far more deserving of repayment than “stock-jobbers.” See WRIGHT & COWEN, 
supra note 154, at 23; CHERNOW, supra note 24, at 304-05.  In the end Hamilton’s argu-
ment that the notes were negotiable instruments that constantly fluctuated in value 
won the day, and only the current holders were permitted to exchange them for the new 
notes the federal government offered. WRIGHT & COWEN, supra note 154, at 23. 
 273. See Bates, supra note 272, at 39; E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: 
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776-1790 270 (1961) (showing that some of 
the most active speculators predicted that the federal government would assume state 
debts as early as 1788). Much of the trading in late 1789 was already among secondary 
purchasers, and a good deal of the price rise was attributable to a large influx of foreign 
purchasers into the United States market. See id. 
 274. See ROBERT F. JONES, “THE KING OF THE ALLEY,” WILLIAM DUER POLITICIAN, EN-
TREPRENEUR, AND SPECULATOR 1768-1799 126-34 (1992) [hereinafter JONES, “THE KING 
OF THE ALLEY”]; Robert F. Jones, William Duer and the Business of Government in the 
Era of the American Revolution, 1975 WM. & MARY Q. 393, 409. Duer had actually been 
speculating in national and state debt for several years, including during his time at the 
predecessor Board of Treasury. See JONES, “THE KING OF THE ALLEY,” supra, at 118-19, 
123-26; JOHN S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 
158-65, 183-84 (1917).  
     When Duer continued his purchases in his new post, however, he violated the provi-
sions of the recently passed Act to establish the Treasury Department, which provided 
that “no person appointed to any office instituted by this act, shall directly or indirectly 
be concerned . . . in the purchase or disposal of any public securities of any State, or of 
the United States . . . .” Ch. 12, 1st Cong., 1 Stat. 65 (1789). Anyone violating what was 
arguably the country’s first statutory ban on insider trading was subject to a $3,000 fine, 
removal from office, and a permanent bar from holding any future federal office. While 
not applicable to congressional trading, the act does suggest the contemporary view re-
garding the seriousness and nature of the offense. The crime was defined as a “high 
misdemeanor,” meaning that the victim was the government itself, rather than the in-
dividuals with whom the Treasury official traded. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: 
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Hints that members of Congress were speculating in state securi-
ties were circulating even before Hamilton’s nomination. Andrew Crai-
gie, an apothecary, financier, and land speculator who made a fortune 
trading revolutionary-era debt, charged in September 1789 that Con-
gress would delay consideration of the debt because members’ “private 
arrangements are not in readiness for speculation.”275 Craigie liked to 
boast about how his strong political connections informed his trad-
ing,276 and his correspondence reveals intimate knowledge of nonpub-
lic Senate debates.277 Because he lived in the same lodging house with 
several members of Congress, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
they disclosed information to him, although it is unclear whether they 
also shared in his profits.278 William Constable, one of the largest New 
York speculators, seemed to have equally good sources in the Sen-
ate.279 
Most of the accusations of actual congressional insider trading, as 
opposed to tipping, come from an ardent republican senator from west-
ern Pennsylvania, the irascible diarist William Maclay.280 Maclay ex-
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 61 (1973). This definition suggests that the act’s draft-
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nonpublic information was wrongful because it imposed a reputational harm on the gov-
ernment. Respect for the new federal government would arguably diminish if Treasury 
officials used their offices for personal gain. See supra notes 198-211 and accompanying 
text. As a result, the act was the first federal statute to explicitly include removal and 
disqualification as punishments for official misbehavior. See Paul Taylor, Congress’s 
Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal 
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     Duer resigned from his position in April 1790, but he was never prosecuted for his 
trading. See JONES, “THE KING OF THE ALLEY,” supra note 274, at 133. 
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 277. See Bates, supra note 272, at 41. 
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 279. FERGUSON, supra note 273, at 328 (quoting Letter from William Constable to 
Gouverneur Morris, February 3, 1790) (stating that Senator Robert Morris “promises 
that when the Bill comes up in the Senate He will apprise me when to strike.”)). 
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plicitly accused several members of speculating in depreciated certifi-
cates.281 They included fellow Pennsylvanians Senator Robert Mor-
ris282 and Representatives Thomas Fitzsimons and Daniel Hiester as 
well as Connecticut Representative Jeremiah Wadsworth (the Com-
missary General during the Revolutionary War).283 “I really fear,” 
Maclay wrote, “the [m]embers of Congress are deeper in this business 
than any others.”284 Six months later Maclay remained horrified at the 
level of influence peddling and congressional speculation he thought 
had occurred.285 
The literature regarding speculation in government securities 
during this time period is extensive, making a thorough analysis here 
impracticable.286 Much of it is also only marginally relevant because it 
focuses on the motivations behind the framing of the Constitution as 
 
 281. Id. at 183.  
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lowed account books”). For an overview, see FERGUSON, supra note 273, at 251-343. 
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opposed to the institutional norms addressed here.287 It is certainly 
possible, however, that Maclay, given his antipathy to the funding 
plan,288 his overwhelming belief in his own rectitude, and his absolute 
certainty regarding his fellow legislators’ shortcomings,289 exagger-
ated the level of congressional speculation or thought it more wide-
spread than it actually was.290 Most of Maclay’s information seems to 
have been based on rumor and hearsay.291 Maclay’s objections were 
also broader than just congressional insider trading. He also believed 
that members of Congress had an inherent conflict of interest when-
ever proposed legislation affected their investments.292 He strongly ad-
hered to the republican ideal that government officials could only leg-
islate properly if they were completely disinterested. Maclay, there-
fore, found any ownership of debt securities objectionable, even if the 
purchase was not based on material nonpublic information. More 
broadly, Maclay was wary of securities speculation in any form, includ-
ing speculation by those who were not members of the government.293   
A fuller examination of the historical record also raises questions 
about the accuracy of some of Maclay’s allegations. New York specula-
tors had already predicted the outlines of Hamilton’s plan months be-
fore he actually began to write it.294 Some of the congressional trading 
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Maclay reported may never have occurred or may not have been based 
on inside information. For example, Robert Morris, in the throes of se-
vere financial problems in early 1789, began plans to purchase state 
debt securities before Congress met for its first session.295 While some 
of his more elaborate plans never came to fruition,296 he and his 
brother did buy securities later that spring.297 Morris certainly was 
speculating and he had a conflict of interest when he voted on the fund-
ing bill, but his purchases were apparently not premised on inside in-
formation about it. 
Still, Maclay’s own scorn for this kind of speculative activity sug-
gests that the norm against trading on material nonpublic information 
remained in place. Maclay himself reported that those receiving infor-
mation from members of Congress were “abashed” when confronted 
with their behavior.298 Members speculating in certificates even stayed 
away from the congressional session so that they would remain “un-
suspected.”299 These reactions suggest that, whatever the actual level 
of trading, using confidential information acquired through a govern-
mental position was still viewed as improper and that it remained in-
consistent with institutional norms. 
Even Hamilton, who lamented the lack of virtue among the popu-
lace as a whole, continued to cling to the belief that government offi-
cials should be subject to a different standard. In November 1789, 
Henry Lee wrote Hamilton seeking information on the future pro-
spects for the public debt.300 Hamilton did not divulge any information: 
I am sure you are sincere when you say, you would not subject me to 
an impropriety. Nor do I know that there would be any in my an-
swering your queries. But you remember the saying with regard to 
Caesar’s Wife. I think the spirit of it applicable to every man con-
cerned in the administration of the finances of a Country. With re-
spect to the Conduct of such men—Suspicion is ever eagle eyed, And 
the most innocent things are apt to be misinterpreted.301 
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Several years later, when friends urged that he use his inside in-
formation to secure his own fortune, Hamilton, his eye firmly fixed on 
his reputation, said that he would not. “[T]here must be some public 
fools,” he wrote, “who sacrifice private to public interest at the cer-
tainty of ingratitude and obloquy—because my vanity whispers I 
ought to be one of those fools and ought to keep myself in a situation 
the best calculated to render service.”302 As with any standard of be-
havior, evidence that some members of the community violate a norm 
is not necessarily evidence that the norm no longer persists. 
Over one hundred years later another incident of alleged insider 
trading suggests the persistence of the institutional norm in congress 
against exploiting material nonpublic information. In late 1916, Pres-
ident Woodrow Wilson offered to mediate a peace agreement between 
the European powers fighting in World War I.303 News of that offer led 
to a substantial decline in stock prices because American companies 
had made substantial profits supplying the warring factions.304 Almost 
immediately, charges surfaced that the president’s offer had been 
prematurely leaked to Wall Street, allegedly allowing several traders, 
including Bernard M. Baruch and Otto H. Kahn, to make substantial 
profits from short selling before the news broke.305 Thomas W. Lawson, 
a well-known Boston stock trader and the author of a popular tell-all 
book about stock manipulation called Frenzied Finance, then alleged 
that several members of Congress had also profited from advance 
knowledge of the president’s announcement, and that “[t]he good old 
Capitol has been wallowing in Wall Street leak graft for forty years.”306 
Lawson had developed a reputation for wild accusations, but he still 
caused a sensation when he charged that “advance information from 
Washington about [g]overnment affairs” was “one of the commonest 
things in Wall Street.”307 
The House Rules Committee investigation eventually found no ev-
idence of congressional insider trading.308 While it is unclear how thor-
ough that investigation was, there is evidence that members of that 
Congress (just like William Maclay and the members of the Second 
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Continental Congress) considered such behavior a violation of institu-
tional norms. The House authorized the investigation because the 
charges “affect the dignity of this House and the integrity of its pro-
ceedings and the honesty of its Members.”309 Indiana Representative 
William R. Wood similarly argued for an investigation because those 
allegations “constitute an attack upon the integrity of the House and 
its proceedings. They should not be ignored.”310 Illinois Representative 
James R. Mann observed that: “If these charges do not affect the dig-
nity of the House and its proceedings . . . I do not know of charges that 
could be so construed.”311 These statements suggest that a congres-
sional norm against using confidential information for personal gain 
continued into the twentieth century. 
B. Chase’s Reputation after the Flour Scandal 
While civic virtue as the basis for the new republic did not survive 
for long, the sense that Chase had abused the public trust did. Indeed, 
the flour scandal “haunted Chase for the rest of his life.”312 Despite 
exoneration in the Maryland House of Delegates and his later appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court, Chase’s reputation never fully recovered 
from the flour scandal. From a modern perspective, it would seem that 
Chase’s nomination to the Supreme Court is proof enough that the 
flour scandal did not permanently besmirch his reputation. Such a 
conclusion, however, would be inaccurate because the role of Supreme 
Court Justice in the late eighteenth century was nothing like the pin-
nacle of professional achievement that it is today. Alexander Hamil-
ton, who thought that the judiciary was by far “the weakest of the 
three departments of power,” turned down an appointment to the 
Court so that he could practice law in New York.313 John Rutledge left 
his seat on the Court to become a South Carolina state court judge.314 
The Court’s low prestige was coupled with the arduous task of riding 
circuit, a chore so onerous that several Justices resigned their posi-
tions to avoid it.315 
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Washington wrote that he only wanted to nominate to the Su-
preme Court “such men as I conceive would give dignity and lustre to 
our national character,” but the simple fact was that he found it ex-
ceedingly difficult to find prominent and respectable individuals will-
ing to accept the position.316 Washington was also trying both to ap-
point Federalists to the bench and to maintain geographic diversity on 
the Court, further constraining his choices.317 Although Chase had 
originally opposed ratification of the Constitution,318 he was now an 
ardent Federalist, and as a citizen of Maryland he was a viable candi-
date to fill the seat of Virginian John Blair.319 Given his relatively nar-
row options, Washington had little practical choice but to lower his 
standards. In fact, before nominating him to the Supreme Court in 
January 1796, Washington observed that Chase was “unquestionably, 
a man of abilities; . . . [b]ut he is violently opposed in his own State by 
a party, and is besides, or to speak more correctly has been, accused of 
some impurity in his conduct.”320  
Others shared Washington’s assessment of Chase’s character. 
John Adams, who had worked closely with Chase in the Continental 
Congress, was equally wary. He confided to Abigail after the nomina-
tion that: “Mr. Chase is a new Judge, but although a good 1774 Man 
his Character has a Mist about it of suspicion and Impurity which 
gives occasion to the Enemy to censure.”321 Abigail agreed, and she 
wondered, in verse: 
How can a judge enforce that Law gainst some poor Elf 
Which conscience tells him, he hath broke himself[?]  
“[T]he fountain of Justice should be pure as virgin innocence,” she con-
tinued. “[T]he Laws can neither be administerd [sic] or respected if the 
minister of them is not unspotted.”322 
Other government officials expressed similar sentiments. James 
Madison was incredulous. “Chase in the place of Blair!!!!” was all that 
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he could manage to write to Thomas Jefferson.323 But this was not just 
the usual political rancor so typical in the early republic. Fellow mem-
bers of the Federalist Party, who might be expected to minimize 
Chase’s past transgressions for the sake of party unity, continued to 
view Chase as a poor choice for the Supreme Court because of his pre-
vious abuse of trust while in a national office. Samuel Johnston wrote 
his brother-in-law Associate Justice James Iredell: “I have no personal 
acquaintance with Mr. Chase, but am not impressed with a very favor-
able opinion of his moral Character whatever his professional Abilities 
may be.” 324 According to future New Hampshire Senator William 
Plumer, Chase’s bad character had even been immortalized in poetry. 
“I know nothing,” Plumer wrote, “of judge Chase, but from your letter. 
Is he the man mentioned by the satirical writer of The Times. He gives 
him a bad character: 
Flit not around me thus pernicious elf, 
Whose love of country terminates in self__ 
Back to the gloomy shades detested sprite, 
Mangler of rhetoric, enemy of right__ 
Curst of thy father, scum of all that’s base, 
Thy sight is odious, & thy name is Chase.”325  
That bit of doggerel is particularly notable for the way it characterized 
Chase’s wrongdoing. Chase was “an enemy of right” because he had 
placed his own self-interest ahead of his duty to further the public 
good. He was odious because of the way he had abused his public trust. 
Plumer thought that Chase’s nomination did “not increase the respect-
ability or dignity of the judiciary.”326 
Even after he was appointed to the Supreme Court, Chase was 
never able to shake the flour scandal. Leading the effort to discredit 
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Chase were, naturally, the Federalist’s political opponents, the Repub-
licans. Many of those criticisms homed in on Chase’s breach of trust 
and his misappropriation of confidential, nonpublic information. For 
example, in the bitter presidential campaign of 1800, the Republican 
newspaper The Aurora complained vehemently about Chase’s active 
campaigning for John Adam’s re-election. What Chase was “to receive 
as his reward,” for those efforts, the paper noted, “[was] no more pub-
lic, than was the flour speculation at the moment of its conception.”327 
When in that same year Chase heard the sedition trial of John Callen-
der, The Aurora wondered how such a dishonorable man could even be 
a judge. “The effect of appointment to the bench of justice,” wrote the 
editor, William Duane, “of men who have been impeached, and notori-
ously known to have speculated upon the public fortune, by being en-
trusted with, and abusing the public secrets in the hour of danger—can 
be plainly pointed out by Judge Chace [sic].”328 Three years later, in 
the lead-up to his impeachment the newspaper, with the scathing in-
vective typical of the time period, labeled Chase a “monster in politics” 
and reminded its readers of “his breach of confidence as a member of 
Congress.”329 At one Republican dinner in 1804, someone raised a toast 
to Chase, “[w]hose morality and patriotism were exemplified in breach 
of congressional trust.”330 
What conclusions can we draw from the Chase flour scandal and 
the general reactions to it? The incident certainly provides strong evi-
dence that members of the Continental Congress were expected to 
keep information confidential. Twenty-six years after his scheme was 
disclosed, Chase was still scolded for his “breach of confidence as a 
member of Congress.”331 There is no doubt that he was subject to scorn 
for his behavior. Until his death in 1811, Chase was variously referred 
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to as odious, a “monster of politics,”332 and “the most prostitute scoun-
drel, who ever existed.”333 Exploiting confidential information for per-
sonal gain was regarded as so unethical and outrageous that Chase 
was immediately removed from his position as a delegate to the Con-
tinental Congress.334 Although he was eventually exonerated in the 
Maryland House of Delegates, it was on narrow, factual grounds in a 
forum where he retained enormous power.335 Nothing in that determi-
nation suggests that the delegates viewed capitalizing on confidential 
congressional information as anything but a dishonorable breach of 
trust.336 As a result, it is fair to say that in the early republic there was 
a confidentiality norm in Congress that would, if it continued today, 
be more than sufficient to support a claim of insider trading under the 
misappropriation theory.  
While those views are tightly linked to the notions of civic repub-
licanism that prevailed in the revolutionary years, the demise of that 
worldview is, on some level, irrelevant to the question of whether the 
norm against exploiting nonpublic information continued in Congress. 
The rationale offered for that confidentiality norm in the eighteenth 
century is precisely the same one used today to support a ban on con-
gressional insider trading. Alexander Hamilton viewed Chase’s con-
duct as wrongful because it imposed a direct economic harm on the 
national government in the form of higher commodity prices. Much 
more importantly, Chase’s action was considered wrongful because it 
imposed a substantial reputational harm on the government. If 
knowledge of Chase’s actions became known among the populace, it 
would be harder for citizens to believe that members of Congress were 
acting in the public interest rather than for personal financial gain. 
While modern scholars dispute whether congressional insider trading 
fits within current Supreme Court doctrine, they overwhelmingly 
agree that avoiding those reputational harms supports a ban on this 
kind of behavior.337   
C. A Closer Look at the Contemporary Data on Congressional 
Insider Trading 
As an institutional matter, it would make sense for Congress, in 
order to maintain its credibility, to have a norm against exploiting 
nonpublic information. The legislative history of the STOCK Act re-
flects that institutional desire. The committee report explained that 
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Congress was seeking to resolve the uncertainties that the media had 
raised because “it is of the utmost importance for the American people 
to have full confidence that all Members of Congress act to serve the 
American people rather than their own financial interests.”338 Individ-
ual members expressed similar sentiments during consideration and 
debate of the STOCK Act.339 Other statements seemed consistent, with 
varying degrees of specificity, to the existence of just such an institu-
tional norm.340 Speaker after speaker noted that they occupied posi-
tions of trust that prohibited them from profiting personally from the 
confidential information to which they were privy.341 To be sure, it is 
easy to discount these statements, which were made after the current 
scandal over congressional insider trading began. Nonetheless, viewed 
in light of the response to the Chase scandal, they suggest the possi-
bility that the norm against using confidential information for private 
gain that existed in 1778 continued throughout congressional history.  
The contemporary existence of such a norm is also consistent with 
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the existing empirical data on congressional insider trading. The orig-
inal, and still the most prominent, study is by Alan Ziobrowski and his 
co-authors. Examining data from 1993 to 1998, the authors found that 
in the year prior to their purchase the common stocks senators bought 
had a modest cumulative return of 3.4 percent, but in the twelve 
months after they were acquired the cumulative return on those same 
stocks jumped to 28.6 percent.342 Just the opposite occurred with com-
mon stock sales. In the year before the sale, the stocks senators held 
returned 25.1 percent; in the year after the sale, the return was nearly 
zero. The combined purchases and sales beat the market by 85 basis 
points per month, meaning that senators outperformed corporate in-
siders trading their own company’s stock.343 The authors concluded 
from these results that senators were trading at a substantial infor-
mational advantage, an outcome they attributed to the senators’ priv-
ileged access to nonpublic information and a willingness to use it for 
personal profit.344  
A closer look at the data, however, undermines the popular per-
ception that insider trading was rampant in Congress.  An interesting 
and somewhat overlooked aspect of the study is the distribution of 
trading activity among senators. In each year of the Senate study, a 
minority of senators (ranging from a low of 25 percent to a high of 38 
percent) bought individual stocks. How did that compare to averages 
for United States citizens in general? Direct stock ownership is highly 
correlated with household net worth and income, and Senators are, on 
average, significantly wealthier than the average American. The fig-
ures Ziobrowski and his co-authors report closely track direct stock 
ownership percentages in the 1990s for those in the 75 to 89.9 percen-
tiles of net worth.345 These data suggest that the informational ad-
vantages Senators possess did not lead them to engage in more stock 
market activity than their demographic peers, a somewhat surprising 
result if they could violate insider trading laws with impunity and if 
institutional norms allowed them to freely exploit the confidential in-
formation that came their way.  
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Even within this minority of stock traders, there were substantial 
differences in trading behavior. Most senators engaged in just a few 
transactions per year, but a small group of senators were much more 
active. Indeed just four senators accounted for nearly half of the trans-
actions in the sample.346 This skewed distribution is crucial to under-
standing the reported results because the authors of the empirical 
study could not observe senators’ actual returns. Instead, they had to 
construct a synthetic portfolio that attempted to mimic senators’ pur-
chases as a group.347  
Recently, economist Andrew Eggers and political scientist Jens 
Hainmueller re-evaluated the data collected by Ziobrowski and ap-
plied the same methodology to congressional trading during the period 
spanning 2004-2008.348 They found that Ziobrowski’s findings are 
highly dependent on the weighting and modeling choices the authors 
used to construct the synthetic portfolios.349 In fact, Eggers and Hain-
mueller found that the reported abnormal returns were only statisti-
cally significant for three out of the eight specifications of the synthetic 
portfolio.350 In other words, in the majority of model iterations the sen-
ators’ superior performance might simply have been the product of 
random noise.  
Eggers and Hainmueller found similar results for the period 2004-
2008.351 Although some specifications yielded significant results, the 
overall results did not demonstrate pervasive excess returns.352 Eggers 
and Hainmueller also looked at actual congressional portfolio perfor-
mance rather than the synthetic portfolios constructed in the earlier 
studies and found, consistent with most studies of individual trading, 
that members generally underperform the market as a whole.353 In-
deed, even some of the members Schweizer specifically accused of in-
sider trading did not earn unusually high returns.354   
Based on this analysis, Eggers and Hainmueller conclude that 
there is “very little evidence that more than a handful of members of 
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Congress trade stocks at an informational advantage,” a result con-
sistent with the existence of a congressional norm prohibiting mem-
bers from capitalizing on their privileged access to information for per-
sonal profit.355 Ziobrowski’s earlier findings to the contrary are based 
on the unusually good trading performance of just a few members, who 
were perhaps willing to violate those norms.356 As a result, Eggers and 
Hainmueller conclude “that, while isolated members of Congress may 
unethically or even illegally trade based on political information, there 
is no evidence in any period of widespread ‘insider trading.’”357  
To be sure, neither the statements made in the debate over the 
STOCK Act nor the empirical data on congressional insider trading 
definitively shows that the norm against exploiting confidential infor-
mation for personal gain that so clearly existed in 1778 remained in 
place in 2012. Nonetheless, the Chase episode puts the case that the 
STOCK Act was superfluous on firmer footing. At the very least, it 
would seem to shift the burden of persuasion. Rather than being prem-
ised on amorphous obligations to act in the public interest, proponents 
of this view can now point to a specific historical precedent supporting 
the existence of an institutional norm prohibiting the use of nonpublic 
information. For that reason, it seems reasonable to posit that those 
arguing that no such norm existed prior to passage of the STOCK Act 
have the burden of demonstrating when and how that foundational 
norm vanished. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When congressional insider trading hit the headlines in 2011, le-
gal scholars and other commentators debated whether members of 
Congress were subject to the same prohibitions against the improper 
use of material nonpublic information as corporate actors. The debate 
turned on the nuances of insider trading law as it has developed over 
the last four decades. Did members of Congress owe a fiduciary duty 
or other duty of trust and confidence to members of the trading public 
or to the source of their information? Given public outrage during the 
controversy and the historically low levels of public approval of the job 
Congress was doing, it is hardly surprising that the reaction was to 
resolve any uncertainties over the issue by passing the STOCK Act. 
There perhaps was, in addition, enough ambiguity in the insider trad-
ing case law to warrant this legislative fix. In this regard the statute 
was like chicken soup—it was unlikely to hurt, and might actually be 
beneficial. 
Still, debate continues to linger over whether passage of the 
STOCK Act was necessary. This Article offers evidence that it was not. 
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The Chase flour scandal shows that from the earliest days of the Con-
tinental Congress, there was a norm in Congress against exploiting 
material nonpublic information for personal financial advantage. 
Chase’s scheme was considered a scandalous perversion of trust be-
cause he breached the confidences of Congress. If such a breach in-
volved securities transactions, it would fit squarely within the modern 
misappropriation doctrine. While the ideas of civic republicanism on 
which this breach of trust were originally premised quickly faded, the 
underlying rationale for viewing the misuse of confidential infor-
mation as wrongful remains precisely the same in 2014 as it did in 
1778. The behavior was improper because it would cause serious rep-
utational harm to Congress as an institution. The consistency of those 
views, the importance to members of Congress of maintaining institu-
tional respect, and the empirical data on the apparent infrequency of 
congressional insider trading suggest that the norm against using con-
fidential information for personal profit continues to exist. 
 
